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ABSTRACT

Research has recently begun to focus on separable conscious and subconscious aspects of
self-esteem. Meanwhile, research on aggressive behavior has found that some individuals with
high self-esteem are more prone to aggressive behavior. Based on a biopsychosocial approach,
research has shown that appraisals of threat/challenge are marked by distinct physiological
responses – threat appraisals are marked by activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis,
whereas challenge appraisals are marked by activation of the sympathetic adrenal-medullary
axis. The present study examines the relationship between failure feedback, implicit and explicit
self-esteem, appraisals, working memory and aggression in a series of three experiments.
Experiment 1 examined the impact of failure feedback on stress physiology and found that
individuals who displayed a physiological response to failure feedback consistent with a

challenge response, as indicated by an increase in blood pressure without a concurrent increase
in salivary cortisol, were the most likely group to become aggressive. Experiment 2 examined
the relationships between implicit and explicit self-esteem in predicting aggressive behavior.
Implicit self-esteem predicted behavioral inhibition in response to negative feedback such that
higher implicit self-esteem was associated with fewer behavioral inhibition errors. In
Experiment 3, threat/challenge motivations were manipulated to determine their impact on
working memory performance. Increases in feelings of threat were associated with greater
working memory performance, whereas increases in feelings of challenge were associated with
decreases in working memory performance. The present study is the first to examine aggression
in the context of threat/challenge appraisal responses. Overall, this study suggests that appraisals
and physiology can assist in predicting aggressive behavior, although the cognitive mechanism
by which this occurs remains elusive.
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CHAPTER ONE: REVIEW

How do our feelings about our self affect how we react to events in our lives? For more
than one hundred years, a key concept in Psychology has been self-esteem, first defined by
William James (1890a) as the ratio of our successes to our pretensions. Nearly a century later,
this concept experienced a golden age when it was suggested as a panacea for activities ranging
from academic performance (Lane, Lane, & Kyprianou, 2004) to schizophrenia (Knight, Wykes,
& Hayward, 2006). As research has focused on self-esteem, it has become better understood as a
multi-faceted phenomenon that plays a central role in day-to-day experiences (Baumeister,
Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). The present study examines how self-esteem may serve as a
buffer from ego-threatening criticism, and how insufficient levels of implicit self-esteem may
deplete working memory, making individuals more prone to aggressive behavior.
The Self
At the heart of the issue is the self, a concept that has been present in Psychology and
Philosophy since the time of the ancient Greeks. In modern Psychology, the self is seen as a
multi-faceted construct at the center of all conscious psychological processes. This self consists
of three main aspects (for a review, see Baumeister, 1998). First, there is the act of reflexive
consciousness, which involves self-awareness and recognizing the interior being that makes us
who we are. Second, the self contains an interpersonal aspect. Who we are can depend on
context and the people that surround us. Third, the self acts as an active agent, controlling our
actions, making decisions and interacting with the world in a purposeful manner.
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Theoretical Conceptions of the Self
Self-esteem is a byproduct of the reflexive aspect of the self. It is the act of one looking
at oneself and deciding how one feels toward the characteristics that are present (Coopersmith,
1959; Rosenberg, 1965). As we proceed through life, our concept of our self may change based
on our situation. Similarly, the way we feel about our self may vary based on how we feel we
are currently meeting the demands of life. The fluctuations in self-esteem that accompany life
events have helped define self-esteem as a multidimensional construct. Short-term changes in
how we evaluate our self reflect state self-esteem. This is the original conception of self-esteem
theorized by James (1890a): the ratio of our successes to pretensions. Success or failure can
impact our feelings about ourselves at a given moment. These short-term fluctuations are only
temporary – after time, we move on to other tasks and have the opportunity to redeem our worth.
Because of the way state self-esteem is strongly tied to the environment, it tends to be relatively
unstable.
But underlying these ripples in self-evaluation is an overall level of trait (or global) selfesteem. Global self-esteem is a more stable resource that represents the overall evaluation one
has of one self across different situations. Global self-esteem is only moderately correlated with
aggression (Baumeister, et al., 2003) and “adaptive” behaviors (O’Brien, Baroletti, Jeffrey,
Leitzel, & O’Brien, 2006), such as school performance, but is strongly related to life satisfaction
(r = .47, Diener & Diener, 1995), and depression (r = -.66, O’Brien et al., 2006). Twin studies
suggest global self-esteem may even be genetically based (Neiss, Sedikides, & Stevenson, 2002).
In an attempt to maximize self-esteem we may make our feelings about our self more
contingent upon events with which we identify and are likely to succeed (Crocker, Luhtanen,
Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003; Deci & Ryan, 1995). However, this strategy can be risky:
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individuals who have highly contingent self-esteem are especially prone to anger and hostility
following an insult (Paradise & Kernis, 2002). Alternately, an individual can see him or herself
as intrinsically “good” (or bad), and this attitude is not necessarily tied to external events. This
type of self-esteem is referred to as true self-esteem. The difference between true and contingent
self-esteem and the consequences for each type have been enveloped in “self-determination
theory” (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2004; Ryan & Brown, 2006).
With all the aspects of psychology that self-esteem can influence, the overarching
purpose of self-esteem is still debated. Today, two theories have emerged that seem to
encapsulate the causes and consequences of self-esteem (Baumeister, 1998): as an anxiety buffer
(Terror Management Theory), or as an internal measure of how we are succeeding (or failing) in
our interpersonal relationships (the Sociometer Hypothesis). Terror Management Theory (TMT)
proposes that one unfortunate side-effect of a more developed sense of consciousness in humans
is that we are aware of our own mortality. This awareness engenders a certain degree of
existential anxiety for which we develop various symbolic coping mechanisms (e.g. culture,
religion). These institutions allow us to adopt a particular worldview and feel that we are “part
of something larger, more significant, and more eternal” than ourselves (Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Pyszczynski et al. (2004) propose that selfesteem arises in two ways from this worldview: First, we have to believe our worldview is valid,
and second, that we are fulfilling the expectations of the culture around us. Through fulfilling
these two criteria, we are able to deflect our death anxiety by knowing we are part of something
bigger.
There is experimental evidence for TMT (for an extended review, see Pysczinsky et al.,
2004; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pysczinsky, 1991). Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon,
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and Chatel (1992) found that elevating individuals’ self-esteem lowered their feelings of state
anxiety after they watched a video of deadly accidents. Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) examined
the effects that self-esteem could have on information processing in response to mortality
salience inductions. They found that as self-esteem was experimentally increased, the
accessibility of death-related words decreased (Experiment 3). Terror Management Theory does
have its critics: Because self-esteem (in the TMT view) is an accrual of various aspects of the
self (i.e. contingent self-esteem), some authors claim that the self-esteem the Terror Management
theorists examine is not a global self-esteem, but rather many different self-esteem contingencies
(Moller, Friedman, & Deci, 2006).
A second theory regarding the function of self-esteem is the Sociometer Theory (Leary &
Baumeister, 2000; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995). This theory proposes that selfesteem serves less of a defensive mechanism and more of an internal gauge of how we are
succeeding (or failing) in our interpersonal relationships. Low self-esteem, therefore, reflects the
perception of possible exclusion and this is an evolutionarily precarious position. In support of
this theory, inclusion and exclusion feedback do influence self-esteem (Leary et al., 2003), but
only when the group is meaningful to the individual (Leary et al., 1995, Study 3). Furthermore,
retrospective reports of self-esteem do correlate with how included or excluded the person felt in
the given situation (Leary et al., 1995, Study 2). However, subsequent studies have uncovered
evidence that is contrary to the predictions of Sociometer Theory. In a series of studies, Twenge,
Baumeister, Tice & Stucke (2001) showed that exclusion feedback could increase aggression –
something that seems to make the possibility of inclusion less likely (Pyszczynski et al., 2004).
Further studies have shown that self-esteem can sometimes be uncorrelated with valenced-
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ratings of how people feel about their interpersonal relationships (Endo, Heine, & Lehman, 2000,
cited in Pyszczynski et al., 2004).
Although there are many findings that seem to discredit -- or, at least, draw support away
from -- Sociometer Theory, both Terror Management and Sociometer Theory have the common
characteristic of an individual’s perception of how effectively he or she relates to others and his
or her satisfaction with their self. In subsequent sections, this paper will examine the effects of
when the self-esteem buffer is lacking, and the effects this would have on the ability to manage
executive resources, such as working memory and inhibiting behavior.
Measuring the Self
With the value society and researchers place on self-esteem, there has been a significant
amount of attention devoted to issues of measurement. Explicit self-esteem (how one
consciously feels about oneself) is usually measured with self-report questionnaires that are high
in face validity. One of the oldest and most reliable measures of explicit self-esteem is the
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The RSES consists of ten questions
that ask the participant about their feelings toward their self (e.g. “I feel I have a number of good
qualities” and “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”). The scale has shown strong internal
consistency (Cronbach α = .88) and test-retest reliability (r = .82, Fleming and Courtney, 1984).
The RSES has repeatedly been shown to be negatively correlated with neuroticism (r = -.7;
Watson, Suls, & Haig, 2002) and depression (r = -.8; Watson et al., 2002) and positively
correlated with extraversion (r = .5; Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998).
Many other measures have been developed for measuring not only global aspects of selfesteem, but various aspects of self-esteem ranging from its relationship to interpersonal
interactions (e.g. The Texas Social Behavior Inventory; Helmreich, Stapp, & Ervin, 1974) to
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measuring the various sub-components of the self (e.g., Tennessee Self-Concept Scale, Roid &
Fitts, 1988; The Body Esteem Scale, Franzoi & Shields, 1984). For a review of the many
measures of explicit self-esteem, see Blascovich and Tomaka (1991).
In recent years, the idea of subconscious attitudes has gained acceptance in Social
Psychology (Bargh, 1989, 1990; Fazio, Sanbonmatzu, Powell & Kardes, 1986). Whereas
explicit measures reflect conscious reflection and awareness of internal states (Epstein &
Morling, 1995), explicit measures also are prone to conscious control and censorship (e.g., to
control for social desirability concerns). Implicit attitudes, however, are thought to reflect
automatic processes (Teglasi & Epstein, 1998) and are more reflective of associations between
the object and its affective associations. Several methods have been proposed for measurement
of implicit attitudes toward the self. Many have been borrowed from cognitive psychology, and
are based on associative models of knowledge structure (e.g. spreading activation theory;
Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Loftus, 1975).
Two common measures of implicit attitudes toward the self most directly influenced by
Cognitive Psychology are sequential priming (Hetts, Sakuma, & Pelham, 1999) and the Implicit
Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Supraliminal sequential
priming measures the reaction time of a participant during a word categorization task.
Participants categorize words as good or bad, and each word is preceded by primes that are
either self-relevant or not. Although this measure closely mirrors sequential semantic priming
methods (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio et al., 1986), as a measure of selfesteem it has questionable psychometric properties (test-retest reliability = .08; Bosson, Swann,
& Pennebaker, 2000).
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The IAT is another reaction time task that asks the participant to categorize words as
quickly as possible. It consists of seven blocks of trials. In the first block, participants
categorize adjectives as good or bad. Category labels are displayed at the upper left and right of
the computer screen and stimuli appear in the center. The second block involves a similar
categorization task, but this time words are categorized as self or other indicative (e.g. “me”
“myself” “I” vs. “you” “them” “they”). The next two blocks add the first two tasks together –
self and good words are sorted to one side of the screen, whereas bad and other are sorted to the
opposing side. After completing a practice block, the participant completes the categorization
task as quickly as possible. The subsequent two blocks switch the category labels: now self and
bad are to one side, while other and good are to the opposing side. By comparing reaction time
latencies of the self-good to the self-bad tasks, the IAT supposedly measures how well-associated
the self is with good characteristics and objects compared to bad. The IAT has demonstrated low
but reliable test-retest reliability, usually ranging around r = .56 (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000;
Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2006).
These implicit measures tend to weakly correlate with explicit measures, and most
researchers have concluded that explicit and implicit measures are tapping different latent
constructs. Greenwald et al. (2000) used a confirmatory factor analysis technique to examine the
factor structure of implicit and explicit measures of self-esteem. Overall, the best model fit
occurred with a two factor (implicit, explicit) solution with the implicit measures loading onto an
implicit factor and the explicit measures loading on an explicit factor. The two factors were only
weakly correlated (r = .28). Implicit self-esteem is usually considered to be relatively static in a
laboratory setting, but recently investigators have found ways to manipulate implicit self-esteem
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through classical conditioning (Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 2004) and subliminal association
priming (Dijksterhuis, 2004).
With implicit and explicit self-esteem measures tapping different underlying constructs,
the possibility arises that an individual could have high levels of one type of self-esteem while
harboring low levels of the other. In the case where implicit and explicit self-esteem “match”
(i.e. both are high, or both are low), this is usually referred to as secure self-esteem (Jordan,
Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003). If there is a mismatch between explicit and
implicit, it is referred to as discrepant, insecure, or fragile self-esteem (Bosson, Brown, &
Zeigler-Hill, 2003). The situation is usually one in which the individual reports having high selfesteem on explicit measures, but scores below average on measures of implicit self-esteem. This
discrepancy between explicit and implicit measures has shown many interesting relationships to
various phenomena. Individuals who are high in explicit self-esteem, but low in implicit selfesteem, score higher on measures of narcissism (Jordan et al., 2003; Zeigler-Hill, 2006), fail to
self-regulate after negative feedback (Lambird & Mann, 2006), are more negative to outgroup
members (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005; Kernis et al., 2005), and show more unrealistic
optimism than individuals with secure self-esteem (Bosson, et al., 2003).
The converse situation also can occur when an individual has high implicit, but low
explicit, self-esteem. This condition is less common, and seems to be more associated with
depression rather than defensiveness (Jordan, Logel, Spencer, & Zanna, 2006). Logel, Jordan,
Spencer and Zanna (2005) found that students who scored low in implicit and explicit selfesteem were significantly more depressed than individuals who were low explicit/high-implicit.
Individuals with high explicit self-esteem were also more optimistic (Bosson et al., 2003) leading
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Jordan et al. to hypothesize that implicit self-esteem may provide a buffer against depression for
individuals with low explicit self-esteem.
Consequences of Self-Esteem
When there are discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem, what mechanism
could detect this discrepancy and cause the individual to behave differently than someone with
secure self-esteem? One possibility is that a mismatch between implicit and explicit appraisals
of the self could lead to a sort of cognitive dissonance (Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Festinger, 1957;
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Cognitive dissonance is a phenomenon that occurs when an
individual holds two inconsistent attitudes. Currently research is lacking on the relationship
between implicit and explicit attitudes and how they may relate to dissonance, but some research
has found that explicit attitudes – not implicit – are subject to dissonance-related attitude change
(Gawronski & Strack, 2004).
Dissonance is induced in laboratory settings by asking participants to choose to write a
counter-attitudinal essay (e.g. “Why the Board of Regents should authorize a tuition increase for
next semester”). The result of performing this behavior is an arousal of dissonance in the
individual – a general feeling of discomfort associated with a negative affective state (Elliot &
Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones, 2001). Croyle and Cooper (1983) found that participants who
were in a highly-dissonant position maintained an elevated arousal state (as measured by
electrodermal activity) after the task was completed.
The existence of dissonance between attitudes can have consequences for information
processing. In a series of experiments, Briñol, Petty and Wheeler (2006) found that when
discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes were made salient, participants engaged in
more elaborative processing. The authors hypothesize that the reason for this more attentive
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processing was an attempt to resolve the discrepancy between the implicit and explicit attitude
states in order to reduce the negative affect and arousal that is a result of the dissonance. Tesser,
Crepaz, Beach, Cornell, and Collins, (2000) manipulated dissonance and measured the effect it
had on self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) processes. The SEM model (Tesser, 1999)
hypothesizes that self-esteem threat is a confluence of one’s performance on a task, the level of
closeness one feels with others who are being used for comparison, and how relevant the task is
for one’s self-esteem. Therefore, to increase self-esteem after poor performance on a task, an
individual can alter the amount of closeness they feel with someone who is a better performer on
such a task, or they can alter the amount of relevance they place on the task (e.g. “Well I don’t
like math anyway.”) Tesser and colleagues found that individuals who had dissonance aroused
engaged in more SEM behaviors, indicated by feeling closer to a friend who outperformed them
on a low self-relevant task. Previous work (Achee, Tesser, & Pilkington, 1994) had found that
arousal and SEM behaviors are causally related, such that participants in a high arousal condition
performed more behaviors in line with the predictions of SEM than did individuals in a low
arousal condition.
Recently, neurobiology has begun to investigate the neural underpinnings for selfconsciousness. With the advent of fMRI, researchers have begun to use creative methods to
activate self-relevant thought and examine the neurobiological activation that co-occurs. Thus
far, the primary area that correlates with self-related thoughts and activities is the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC; D’Argembeau, et al., 2007; Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, Raichle,
2001; for review see Schmitz & Johnson, 2007). Specifically, across a variety of studies, the
ventral MPFC shows activation during tasks requiring self-relevant thoughts, ranging from
activities with anticipated reward (Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003) to studies
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of pain management (Salomons, Johnstone, Backonja, & Davidson, 2004). The ventral MPFC
(which includes the orbitofrontal cortex) is also involved in the control of aggressive behavior,
which will be discussed in a later section.
The present study will aim to examine how differences in implicit and explicit attitudes
shape how an individual responds to failure feedback. It is hypothesized that individuals with
discrepant self-esteem (high explicit, low implicit) will experience an increase in dissonancerelated arousal, and this arousal will have a deleterious effect on their ability to perform on
subsequent tasks.
Executive Functions
The ability to engage in self-monitoring and response inhibition are maintained by frontal
lobe systems, and constitute processes defined as executive functions. “Executive function” is an
umbrella term of sorts for a wide variety of abilities including choosing goals, inhibiting
impulsive behavior, self-monitoring, and switching tasks when the need arises. Given the
importance of these abilities in daily life, Alexander Luria went as far as to call the frontal lobes
“the organ of civilization” (cited in Goldberg, 2001).
In order to maintain a sense of order in controlled cognition, the mind uses working
memory to coordinate the assignment of attentional resources to different cognitive tasks.
Humans do not have an unlimited amount of attention available to devote to an infinite number
of tasks; instead, working memory allows individuals to devote attention to the task on which
they wish to focus. Alan Baddeley and colleagues have proposed that working memory has four
components: (1) the visuospatial sketchpad, (2) the phonological loop, (3) the episodic buffer,
and (4) the central executive (Baddeley, 1992; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974, Baddeley, 2000;
Baddeley, 2003). The visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop are responsible for holding
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visual images and inner speech, respectively, in short-term memory for immediate processing.
The episodic buffer provides a means for the phonological and visuospatial systems to interact,
thereby creating coherent episodes to encode into memory. The central executive is the aspect of
working memory that decides how to allocate attentional resources and governs behavior, and is
the most relevant to the current discussion.
The Central Executive
Although the central executive is the most important component of Baddeley’s model, it
is also the least understood. In an effort to further understand the role of the central executive in
terms of guiding attention to relevant stimuli and processes, Baddeley (1986) divided the system
into two processes. The first process is mostly automatic, allowing an individual to react to the
environment by using previously learned habits and schemas. The second process is the
supervisory activating system (SAS), which is more controlled and intentional. Whereas
Baddeley resigns himself to admit that the “controller” of the controlled processes may be
nothing more than a homunculus, Baumeister has proposed that the self is at the center of
controlled processes (Baumeister, Muraven & Tice, 2000). Baumeister et al. proposed
“There exists a resource that the self uses for a broad variety of volitional
activities. These activities include overriding response tendencies such as habits
or impulses, making a conscious or deliberate choice, and initiation of action (as
opposed to being passive). In broad terms, the self’s executive function,
including all acts of controlling or altering the self and all acts of decision making
and initiative, depends heavily on this resource.” (p. 131)
The concept of executive function as a resource has several consequences. First, like any
resource, executive functions are limited. Baumeister et al. proposed that this same resource is
responsible for all of the abilities listed above, and therefore if one activity depletes the resource,
the ability to perform other activities (such as inhibiting a response) becomes reduced. Second,

16
if the resource becomes depleted, it takes time to replenish. This proposal is supported by a
number of experiments that show that performing behaviors that deplete the executive resource
(such as regulating emotions) will impair performance on a subsequent unrelated task, such as
physical endurance (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998).
Depletion of the executive resource can occur because of several different mechanisms.
One of the earliest methods examined for depletion of executive resources was the induction of
negative mood states (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). In a series of experiments, Ellis, Thomas, and
Rodriguez (1984) induced negative mood states in participants and recorded their abilities to
encode memories. Sentence difficulty was manipulated such that some sentences required more
effort than others to encode. The researchers found that those participants who were induced to
feel depressed were impaired at encoding sentences that required greater amounts of effort or
elaborative encoding. Ellis et al. proposed that this decrease in encoding is due to a reduction in
attention resources due to negative affect.
Cognitive Psychology has developed several methods for measuring working memory,
most of which involve attempting to actively retain information for a short period of time
through rehearsal, or perform two tasks concurrently. In nonhuman primates, the task that is
most often used is a delayed matching to sample task in which the animal has to hold an item’s
location in memory in order to successfully identify the item on a subsequent trial. In humans,
one task that has gained widespread use for measuring working memory is the operation span
task (OST; Turner & Engle, 1989). In this task, the participant is shown a math problem and
asked to indicate whether the provided answer is correct (e.g. “Is (9/3) – 2 = 1?”). At the end of
the problem, the participant is given a word to remember and then presented with another
problem to solve and another word to remember. At the end of a set of two to seven items, the
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participant is asked to recall the words in order they were presented. Working memory is
quantified as the number of words successfully recalled at the end of each set. In addition to the
OST, tasks have also been developed for reading span (reading a sentence and being asked to
remember the last word), and spatial span (remembering the location of a cue while performing a
subsequent task; for a general review of span tasks, see Conway, et al., 2005).
Because working memory seems to reflect the ability of an individual to devote attention
to particular tasks, some authors have even referred to working memory capacity as executive
attention (Redick, Heitz, & Engle, 2007). Since attention is generally understood to be a limited
resource (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), differences in working memory capacity should be reflected
in an individual’s ability to perform various tasks that require different amounts of attention.
Indeed, this is the case: OST scores predict the ability of an individual to successfully shadow a
voice in a dichotic listening task (Conway, Cowan & Bunting, 2001), the amount of interference
that occurs in a list-learning task (Rosen & Engle, 1998), and the ability to suppress unwanted
thoughts (Brewin & Beaton, 2002).
Although working memory has been a staple in the cognitive literature for over a quarter
century, cognitive neuroscience has struggled to define the neurological mechanisms by which
attention can be actively distributed to different tasks depending on the goals of the organism.
Hazy, Frank, and O’Reilly (2006) have recently proposed a Prefrontal Cortex, Basal Ganglia
Working Memory (PBWM) model, which suggests that executive functioning is maintained
through the interaction of three areas: the posterior cortex, the hippocampus, and a prefrontalbasal ganglia system which is responsible for “active maintenance of internal contextual
information (PFC) which can be dynamically updated by the basal ganglia” (p 106). In their
model, Hazy et al. propose that working memory is an emergent phenomenon that occurs as a
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result of the interactions between these three networks. The prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia
communicate in such a way that the basal ganglia can either allow information to enter the
working memory system, or close off external stimuli such that the working memory module
becomes a closed loop. The majority of the work with this model has been done using neural
network models, and thus far the system is able to replicate task performance on tasks such as
Stroop interference and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task.
Mapping working memory in the brain has not been an easy task (for review, see Curtis
& D’Esposito, 2006). Initial ablation studies in nonhuman primates indicated that the prefrontal
cortex was a critical component for working memory tasks (Jacobsen, 1936; Fuster, 1997), and
real-time recordings in nonhuman primates from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex showed
activation that was believed to encode representations that were being “held” in memory for the
task being performed (Goldman-Rakic, 1987).
Functional imaging studies and invasive electrophysiological recordings in nonhuman
primates have found that working memory is not a “frontal lobe only” phenomenon. In addition
to the activation of the prefrontal cortex during working memory tasks, regions that are involved
in the selection and processing of the particular type of stimuli the task involves also show an
increased level of activation (Curtis, Rao, & D’Esposito, 2004; D’Esposito, 2007; Kastner &
Ungerleider, 2001). One theory is that the prefrontal cortex is providing top-down modulation to
maintain activity in processing areas, but this theory has proven difficult to test in humans (but
see Fuster, Bauer, & Jervey, 1985, cited in D’Esposito, 2007).
Behavioral Inhibition
Working memory is also seen as one factor that contributes to a person’s ability to inhibit
unwanted thoughts and behaviors (Kane & Engle, 2003). In a series of experiments, Kane and

19
Engle examined differences in performance on a Stroop task. The authors found that individuals
with low span (i.e. lower working memory capacity) made more errors, and, as the task goal
changed, low span participants had more difficulty maintaining the task goal, which resulted in a
slower reaction time. The authors concluded that working memory capacity is an important
resource when an individual is attempting to maintain a goal in the face of distracting
information. It should be noted, however, that in all of the experiments, participants were
divided by pre-existing working memory capacity abilities – working memory was not
experimentally manipulated.
Neuropsychology and Psychiatry also have relied extensively on the Go/No-go task when
attempting to measure an individual’s ability to inhibit behavior. The Go/No-go task requires a
participant (human or nonhuman primate) to respond to certain stimuli, but not others. This can
be accomplished using various types of stimuli such as pressing a button when a green (but not
red) square appears, or when any letter of the alphabet (but not X) is shown. Iversen and
Mishkin (1970) found that Go/No-go performance was significantly impaired in macaques after
lesioning of the inferior convexity (homologous to the right inferofrontal gyrus (IFG) in
humans). Later studies in humans confirmed the role of the right IFG in inhibiting the response
tendency (Konishi, Nakajima, Uchida, Sekihara, & Miyashita, 1998), in concert with the
presupplementary motor area and indirect pathway of the basal ganglia (Aron & Poldrack, 2006).
This role of the indirect pathway in stopping behavior is central to the model of working memory
proposed by Hazy et al. (2006) in which the basal ganglia “gates” information.
Social Psychology has attempted to experimentally manipulate behavioral inhibition,
often in experiments that require the participant to exercise some level of self-regulation
(Baumeister et al., 2000). Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven and Tice (1998) examined the
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extent to which impulse control can also deplete executive resources. Hungry participants were
exposed to plates of chocolate chip cookies and candy, but told not to consume the snacks –
instead they would get to eat from a bowl of radishes. A control group was allowed to eat from
the more appetizing snacks. Following the self-control manipulation, participants were asked to
complete a figure-tracing task. Individuals who were forced to exhibit self-control by not eating
the delicious treats gave up on the figure-tracing task faster than participants who were allowed
to eat from the tempting dishes.
In addition to self-control depleting the executive resources, the converse is also true:
completing other tasks that deplete resources can reduce the ability to inhibit undesirable
behavior. Muraven, Collins and Neinhaus (2002) tested the idea that exhibiting cognitive
inhibition could deplete executive resources and thereby reduce the ability to self-regulate. Male
drinkers were brought into the lab and asked to suppress thoughts of a white bear, or perform
mental arithmetic (a control group did not perform this part of the task). They were then told
they would perform on a driving simulator and would be rewarded for high scores. Before the
driving simulator, they were given the opportunity to drink beer. Those who had performed the
tasks that drained the executive resource consumed more alcohol (possibly indicative of a loss of
self-control) compared to control participants.
Although these studies provide evidence of a loss of behavioral self-control, they do not
examine the mediating cognitive mechanisms that may be the cause of behavior. In the current
proposed study, executive control will be measured and the relationship to behavioral inhibition
will be examined. Furthermore, the influence of a personality/individual difference variable
(self-esteem) will be examined for its ability to predict an individual’s cognitive functioning after
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negative feedback. This understanding of how feedback affects cognition will be essential for
predicting how the cognitions then guide behavior.
Aggression
Self-esteem and self-control are phenomena that occur within the individual, but humans
are especially social creatures, and changes in information processing can have consequences for
how we interact with others around us. In some situations, individuals can be more prone to
behave in prosocial ways (Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, 1998; Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, &
Darley, 2002), while in other situations they can be driven to act out aggressively. Aggressive
behavior has significant societal implications that have created an impetus for research on the
causes of aggression and possible ways to reduce the number of aggressive acts.
Historical Perspectives
One of the first individuals to ponder the causes and control of aggression was Aristotle
(350 BCE). In his Nichomachean Ethics, he pointed out “any one can get angry- that is easy. .
.but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and
in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy” (Book II, Chapter 9 – Translated by W.
D. Ross). Aristotle did not directly address the causes of anger, but recognized it as one of the
passions that, if used in excess, was contrary to a virtuous existence.
Two millennia after Aristotle, Freud developed psychoanalytic theory, which placed
emphasis on the subconscious and ways it could drive behavior. Freud believed there were
several innate drives in humans that motivated individuals to behave in particular ways. For
example, the libido was the sexual drive that motivated individuals to pursue sexual activities
and interests. If any of these drives were not given an outlet, they would begin to build up in the
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individual who would need to find a way of releasing the energy. If an appropriate outlet was
not available, the psyche could use sublimation to channel the energy into some other form of
behavior to give it an outlet. Freud believed aggression was the result of built-up sexual energy
that needed to find a release. In other words, individuals who did not have appropriate ways to
release their sexual energy were prone to aggression. Furthermore, Freud saw this aggressive
instinct as something that was natural “instinctive endowment” (Freud, 1930/1969, p. 68).
Normally the aggressive impulse is kept in check, but Freud recognized that certain situations
can disarm the “mental counter-forces which ordinarily inhibit it” (Freud, 1930/1969, p. 69).
Although Freud addressed innate drives that could be the cause of aggressive behavior, a
group of psychologists led by John Dollard applied Freud’s psychoanalytic theories of
aggression to behaviorism and developed the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (Dollard, Doob,
Miller, Mowrer & Sears, 1939). Briefly stated, frustration-aggression theory suggests that when
an organism is prevented from achieving a goal, this results in frustration, which in turn produces
aggressive energy and behavior (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). As this aggressive energy builds up
in the organism, the aggressive outburst will become more intense. Normally the organism may
be able to inhibit this aggressive impulse out of fear of consequences (e.g. attacking a more
dominant member of the social hierarchy could have deadly consequences), but Miller (1948)
proposed that if the energy becomes great enough it can override the inhibiting mechanisms
(cited in Tedeschi & Felson, 1994).
The idea of aggression being a result of frustration spurred decades of research on the
topic (for review, see Berkowitz, 1993; Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). As research progressed,
disagreement on terminology began to arise. Dollard et al. (1939) limited their definition of
aggression to that which causes injury to another organism (p. 11), but researchers limited to
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ethical practices in the laboratory developed numerous methods that did not necessarily cause a
direct injury to another individual. Similarly, researchers disagreed on the causes of frustration.
Whereas Dollard et al. defined frustration as the inability to achieve a goal, Buss (1961) saw
personal attack as instigation to aggression that does not necessarily block a goal.
Categories of Aggression
In an attempt to explain the various findings engendered by frustration-aggression theory,
Berkowitz (1981, 1988, 1999) developed a theory of aggression that relied more on the affective
experience of the organism and less on goals and behaviorism. Berkowitz agreed that frustration
can cause aggression, but only if the organism experiences the frustration as aversive. It is the
aversive experience itself, Berkowitz proposed, that activates the aggressive response of the
organism. Furthermore, Berkowitz divided aggression into two types: reactive and instrumental.
Reactive, or emotional, aggression is the traditional form of behavior that aims at directly
harming an individual. According to Berkowitz, reactive aggression is the result of a confluence
of many different psychological states, but primarily involves negative affect paired with
heightened arousal. Experimental evidence for this hypothesis has been obtained through both
animal and human studies. Azrin, Hutchinson, Ulrich and Norman (1964) demonstrated that
administering electrical shocks to rats could induce fighting between the animals, and the
probability of fighting could be predicted by the duration of the shocks. This aggressive
response was also subject to modification through the principles of instrumental learning: if
attacking another animal caused the shocking to stop (negative reinforcement), next time the
animal was shocked it was more likely to become aggressive (Knutson, Fordyce, & Anderson,
1980).
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In humans there is substantial support for the theory that unpleasant affect increases
reactive aggression. A long-standing theory in social psychology has liked increases in
aggressive behavior to increases in temperature (the heat-aggression hypothesis). Baron and Bell
(1975) showed that if a participant was in a hot room (over 90 degrees Fahrenheit), they were
more aggressive towards a peer during an interaction where they were given the opportunity to
punish the individual. Berkowitz, Cochran and Embree (1981) had research participants place an
arm in a bath of water that was either a neutral temperature or uncomfortably cold. Participants
whose arm was in the cold water were significantly more aggressive and less rewarding toward a
confederate than those whose arm was in the neutral temperature water. One interesting aspect
to both of these situations is that the other person bore no responsibility for the uncomfortable
situation (the temperature of the room or the water), yet was the target of the aggressive
behavior. Berkowitz (1983) points out that situations other than uncomfortable temperatures
increase aggressive behavior, including irritable cigarette smoke (Jones & Bogat, 1978) and
disgusting scenes (White, 1979).
Additional evidence for aggression being caused by negative affect has been found using
clinically depressed individuals, and participants who underwent a depressive mood induction.
Berkowitz (1983) cites numerous studies where the researcher’s primary interest was other than
aggression (for example, Seligman’s learned helplessness studies, 1975), but aggressive behavior
was frequently observed in the studies. Further support for this hypothesis comes from findings
that show individuals with depression often show an increase in hostility and emotional
aggression (Bonime, 1966; Poznanski & Zrull, 1970; Miller & Norman, 1979).
In the Velten Procedure (Velten, 1968), healthy participants read a series of statements
aloud. These statements are all either positive (“This is great – I really do feel good – I am
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elated about things”) or negative (“I have too many bad things in my life”). After reading these
statements, the participants are usually induced into the mood (elation or depression) congruent
with the valence of the statements. Hynan and Grush (1986) induced depressed affect in healthy
participants using the Velten procedure and found that men who were highly impulsive and
induced to have a depressed mood were more aggressive than those who did not undergo a mood
induction.
The second type of aggression, according to Berkowtiz, is instrumental aggression.
Instrumental aggression is aggressive behavior that is not directed at harming an individual as the
end goal, but uses the aggression as a means to achieving another end. Bullies are an excellent
example of instrumental aggressors. Berkowitz (1993) cites data from Olweus (1978) where
teachers of over one-thousand adolescent males were surveyed regarding the aggressive
tendencies of their students. Olweus found that those characterized as bullies (about 5% of the
sample) acted intentionally, carefully choosing their aggressive interactions in a bid to achieve
power and dominance.
Psychopaths potentially provide an extreme example of instrumental aggressors.
Williamson, Hare and Wong (1987) examined the case files of hundreds of nonpsychotic male
inmates in the Canadian criminal system and selected a group of psychopathic (N = 68) and
nonpsychopathic inmates (N = 52) based on their scores on the Psychopathy Checklist (Hare,
1980). One of the most striking differences between the groups was the absence of “affective
colouring” that accompanied the violent behavior.
Case studies of well-known “serial killers” also provide insights into the instrumental
flavor of their aggressive acts. Jeffrey Dahmer, who killed more than fifteen men and boys
during the 1980s, did so with the intention of fulfilling his necrophilic desires (Bennett, 1993;
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Schwartz, 1992). Although Dahmer had feelings of loss after killing his victims, the feelings did
not last long and he recognized upon reflection that his moral compass was “so off” (Schwartz,
1992). Most serial killing is associated with a sexual motive, although it is unclear how many
murders each year are associated with sexual motives due to the absence of classification in the
FBI reporting system (Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas, 1995).
Recently, there have been calls to move past the hostile/instrumental distinction in order
better understand and predict aggressive behavior. Bushman and Anderson (2001) have
integrated the study of aggression with findings from social cognition and proposed using a
framework of knowledge structures (such as scripts and schemas) to better understand how
aggressive behavior is learned and enacted. This move away from a dichotomization of
aggression and towards a social-cognition perspective has begun to produce new ways of
analyzing aggressive behavior in the past decade (see Douglas, et al., 2008; Fontaine, 2008).
One of the primary sources Bushman and Anderson use for arguing for a rejection of the
hostile/instrumental dichotomy is the difficulty the legal system has had in drawing the
distinction. Interestingly, in the past, the concept of executive control has been closely linked to
aggressive behavior in the United States and British justice systems (Vronsky, 2004). In
contemplating a definition for what constitutes “insane” behavior, the defense relied on what was
termed “The M’Naghten Rule.” Originally, this rule stated that in order to qualify as “insane” at
trial, a defendant had to be unable to discern between right and wrong behavior (Queen v.
M’Naghten, 1843). In subsequent decisions, the rule was revised to include individuals who
“lost the power to choose between the right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as
that his free agency was at the time destroyed” (State of Alabama v. Parsons, 1887, cited in
Vronsky, 2004). This definition has since been rejected in favor of the more parsimonious
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“knowledge of right or wrong” rule, but demonstrates that the idea of being able to control
aggressive impulses has been an important criterion at times in determining culpability.
The Neurobiology of Aggression
Recently, research has begun to examine the cognitive and neural relationships between
executive functioning and aggressive behavior. Differentiating between reactive and
instrumental aggressors, Raine et al. (1998) examined glucose metabolism using positron
emission tomography (PET) in samples of affective (reactive) murderers, predatory
(instrumental) murderers, and healthy controls. Participants completed a continuous
performance task while undergoing a PET scan. The continuous performance task increases
frontal lobe activity in normal controls (Buchsbaum et al., 1990), and the authors replicated this
result. There was no difference in prefrontal activity in predatory (instrumental) aggressors,
compared to controls, but affective (reactive) aggressors showed a reduced level of activity in
both the left and right prefrontal regions.
In a study of impulsive murderers, Amen, Hanks, Prunella and Green (2007) compared
the blood perfusion levels in murderers and healthy controls. The authors found no difference in
regional blood flow between the two groups at a resting level, but when the participants were
asked to perform a Go/No-go task, murderers showed a lower level of perfusion in the anterior
cingulate and orbitofrontal cortex compared to control participants. These results hint at
differences in ability to inhibit unwanted responses, although the authors did not present any
performance data in their results.
Similar to the model proposed by Berkowitz (1993) in which aggression is one possible
outcome of anger, Panksepp (1998) has proposed the existence of a “RAGE” circuit that
underlies aggressive behavior in animals. It is important to note that in this model, aggression

28
does not necessarily follow from anger; there are different types of behavior, such as predation
and territoriality, which can be characterized as “aggressive” but may not mean the aggressor is
“angry” at the target. This RAGE circuit encompasses the medial amygdala (MeA),
hypothalamus, and periaqueductal grey (PAG) matter. These three regions communicate
hierarchically such that the MeA is dependent on the functioning of both the hypothalamus and
PAG, the hypothalamus is only dependent on the PAG, and the PAG can still evoke anger even
if the hypothalamus and MeA have been ablated (Panksepp, 1998). Modulation of the RAGE
pathways comes from higher cortical areas, including the orbitofrontal cortex which innervates
the MeA, PAG, lateral and posterior hypothalamus (Barbas, 1988; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004;
Rempel-Clower & Barbas, 1998). Many of these connections with the OFC are reciprocal, and a
large amount of communication occurs between the amygdala and OFC.
Neuroimaging of structural and functional differences in aggressive individuals,
compared to controls, have consistently found some level of dysfunction in the frontal cortices.
In a study of 40 psychiatric patients with histories of aggressive behavior, Amen, Stubblefield,
Carmichael, and Thisted (1996) found decreased activity in the frontal lobe, and increased
activity in the left limbic regions. This is interesting when put into the context of EEG
asymmetry research which considers the left hemisphere dominant for “approach-related”
behaviors and the right hemisphere dominant for withdrawal motivations (Davidson, 1992;
Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). Many studies have not differentiated between specific regions of
the frontal cortex, but subsequent studies have identified a prominent role for the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) in the control of aggressive behavior.
Evidence for the involvement of the OFC in aggressive behavior has come from more
specific neuroimaging studies and from neuropsychological case studies. In a landmark study by
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Grafman et al. (1996), survivors of the Vietnam War who suffered frontal lobe injuries were
compared to individuals who experienced other head injuries, and healthy controls. The authors
found that if the OFC was involved in the injury, the individual was significantly more
aggressive (as measured by self-report of previous aggressive acts, and by report of a family
member) than controls and individuals who had other lesions.
Other studies have examined the result of injury to the OFC and the resulting ‘acquired
sociopathy’ that can occur as a result (Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Damasio, 1994; Eslinger &
Damasio, 1985). Many theories have attempted to account for the cause of the increase in
aggression that occurs as a result in OFC injury. Damasio (1994) has proposed that individuals
with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage have a faulty somatic marker system such that they
are unable to monitor their body’s changes in response to the environment and attend to internal
‘alarm signals’ (Blair et al., 2000). Evidence for this hypothesis has included findings that these
patients are often impaired in a gambling task, and show an absent or decreased level of
physiological arousal in response to visual stimuli (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson,
1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990).
The somatic marker hypothesis is not without its critics. Experimental evidence that is
counter to the predictions of the hypothesis is beginning to accumulate. In one case of acquired
sociopathy, resulting from damage to the OFC, the individual did not show any impairment in
somatic marker responses or gambling task performance (Blair et al., 2000). In a clever study by
Ishikawa, Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, and Lacasse (2001), it was found that individuals who did have a
history of psychopathic behavior but had never been caught showed greater physiological
reactivity to writing an essay describing their faults and weaknesses and then delivering the
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speech. These “successful psychopaths” also did not show a difference in WCST performance
when compared to psychopathic individuals who had been caught and incarcerated.
A second theory for the role of the OFC has been proposed by Rolls (1996). In
opposition to Damasio’s Somatic Marker Hypothesis, Rolls has proposed that the circuitry of the
OFC lends it more to a role of monitoring representations of reward and punishment
relationships. One of the primary inputs into the OFC is from the insula/gustatory pathways and
this establishes a direct path for primary reinforcement input into the frontal lobe. In addition to
these and other sensory pathways, the OFC receives input from the object pathways for visual
perception. Rolls hypothesizes that the OFC forms representations of reward and punishment
and integrates the incoming sensory information to form relationships between objects and
reward. Evidence for the role of OFC in reward contingencies in humans comes from studies
that have found deficits in task switching when reward conditions switch during a modified
Wisconsin card sorting task (Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994).
Another theory that has been proposed as a mechanism for aggression is that aggressive
behavior occurs as a result of a reduced ability to inhibit aggressive impulses (Blair, 2005;
Coccaro, 1998). Evidence for this idea comes from findings that executive function deficits are
often associated with increases in aggressive behavior (Giancola & Zeichner, 1994; Giancola,
Moss, Martin, Kirisci, & Tarter, 1996; Lau, Pihl, & Peterson, 1995, for review see Brower &
Price, 2001). Additional evidence has been found in the research on the relationship between
alcohol and aggression. For many years, alcohol has been known to cause a disinhibition of
behavior, and researchers have theorized that this may result in an increase in aggressive
tendencies while under the influence of alcohol (Muehlberger, 1956, cited in Bushman &
Cooper, 1990). In a meta-analysis of the literature at the time, Bushman et al. determined that

31
alcohol does, in fact, facilitate aggressive tendencies. Interestingly, in subsequent work,
Giancola (2004) has found that this relationship between alcohol and aggression is strongest for
men with low executive functioning scores, but not for men with preexisting high levels of
executive functioning.
Aggression Towards the Self
Whereas social psychologists and criminologists are interested in how aggressive
behavior can be directed at other individuals, clinical psychology has historically been interested
in how an individual can direct aggression at his or her self. In his object relations theory, Freud
proposed that as a normal part of development, an individual directs his or her inner drives
towards individuals in the environment. For example, as a person grows out of childhood, he or
she develops a libidinal drive that is directed towards a particular object – ideally one’s spouse.
However, if the relationship is broken, the drive can be redirected at the individual’s ego,
resulting in narcissism (Freud, 1914). Freud proposed that this same redirection of drives holds
true for aggression: “murderous impulses” against others can lead an individual to an ego
attempting to commit suicide.
This theory of suicide as aggression directed toward oneself was advanced by Karl
Menninger (1938). Menninger elaborated on Freud’s concepts of a death instinct that was
normally kept under control by a reciprocal life instinct, and hypothesized that suicide was the
result of this death instinct either being turned against oneself, or an insufficient “erotic impulse”
to suppress the destructive urge. Thus, the psychoanalytic tradition has a strong history of
associating self-destructive and outward-directed aggressive behavior.
Recent research has expanded on the potential relationship between suicidality and
aggressive behavior. Multiple studies have identified a link between aggressiveness and suicide,
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such that aggression increases the risk of suicidal behavior (Duberstein & Conwell, 1997; Nock
& Marzuk, 2000). In a review of the literature, Conner, Duberstein, Conwell, & Caine (2003)
proposed that, specifically, reactively aggressive individuals who are especially prone to suicidal
tendencies. In their theory, the authors propose that because suicidal individuals show
dysfunctional serotonin transmission (Mann, Brent, & Arango, 2001), they are more impulsive
and therefore more prone to aggression. The authors note correlations between prisoner suicide
likelihood and level of aggressiveness in the offense they are imprisoned for, such that those
convicted of murder or manslaughter are more likely to attempt suicide (DuRand, Burtka,
Federman, Haycox, & Smith, 1995; Kerkhof & Bernasco, 1990). Subsequent studies have found
a link between means of suicide and history of aggression, such that individuals who die by more
violent means (e.g. hanging, gunshot) have a higher lifetime history of aggression than those
who died of less violent means (e.g. drug ingestion, carbon monoxide asphyxiation; Dumais et
al., 2005a).
One motif in the aggression and suicide literatures is that of impulsivitiy. Impulsiveness
is thought to have three underlying factors: motor, attentional, and nonplanning (Patton,
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995). Overall, these three factors attempt to measure the lack of ability an
individual has to control thoughts and behaviors (e.g. “I am restless at the theatre or lectures,” “I
act on the spur of the moment,” “I say things without thinking”). Prison inmates and those with
substance abuse problems tend to score higher on the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Patton et
al., 1995), as do individuals with a family history of suicidal behavior (Roy, 2006), and those
who die by violent means (Dumais, Lesage, Lalovic, et al., 2005). This involvement of
impulsiveness in aggression has been identified as an independent predictor of suicide among
clinically depressed individuals (Dumais, Lesage, Aida, et al., 2005).
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The ability to inhibit impulses, as discussed above, is one of the roles of the executive
functioning system. Therefore, one of the aims of the present study is to further examine the
relationship between the ability to inhibit behaviors, and how this may be affected by the level of
implicit self-esteem. To date, no studies have investigated the relationship between discrepant
self-esteem and executive functioning. Given that a heightened level of impulsivity (i.e. lowered
inhibition ability) makes individuals more prone to aggression, it is plausible that if the ability to
inhibit impulses is depleted, this could make those individuals more prone to aggress, against
either themselves or others.
Emotion, Arousal & Aggression
Although psychopathic killings grab national headlines, the majority of killings occur
because of arguments, money, or jealousy (Berkowitz, 1993; Wolfgang, 1967). According to
Berkowitz, activation of the emotional response system – specifically anger – leads to aggressive
impulses, and a significant amount of research has focused on what cognitive mechanisms can
lead an individual to become angry. But many people go through the same types of experiences
without becoming aggressive, or even angry. In his pioneering studies of arousal and emotion,
Stanley Schachter (1959; Schacter & Singer, 1962) examined the contextual and cognitive
conditions that could cause a person to experience different types of emotions. Central to his
theory of emotional lability was the idea that emotions are the result of two factors: First, the
bodily experience of emotion – increased heartbeat, sweating, general arousal – and second, how
an individual interprets this change in physiology.
In a series of experiments, Schachter and Singer (1962) injected research participants
with epinephrine or placebo. A control group received no injection. In addition to receiving the
injection, half of the participants were told of the effects of epinephrine would have on their

34
body – increased heart rate, feeling warm, sweating – and the other half were told false side
effects, such as dizziness (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Following administration of the injection,
participants were exposed to a confederate who behaved in a particular way. In one condition,
the confederate acted foolish, and in another condition the confederate was very hostile and
angry. Participants were then asked to infer their own feelings. If they had been correctly
informed of the effects of epinephrine (i.e. increased arousal), participants attributed their arousal
to the injection and were not affected by the behavior of the confederate. But if they were given
false information regarding the effects of the injection, participants attributed their arousal to the
behavior of the confederate. Those exposed to a silly-acting confederate indicated that they felt
silly, and those exposed to an angry confederate became angry. What is remarkable about this
experiment is that the emotional experience of the participant depended on their cognitive
appraisal of the arousal they were experiencing, and the context to which they were exposed.
The idea of misattributed arousal and how it could relate to aggressive behavior was
extended by Dolph Zillmann (1978, 1979, 1983) in Excitation Transfer Theory. According to
Zillmann, aggressive behavior relies on three processes: arousal, disposition of the individual,
and cognitive appraisal (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). Zillman proposed that high levels of arousal
impair cognitive processing of information, causing the individual to behave more habitually.
Therefore, if an individual is predisposed to behave aggressively, under high arousal the
individual will begin to act in such a way. The process of excitation transfer occurs when the
arousal from one situation is misattributed to another cause, which in turn causes the person to
behave more aggressively towards the person wrongly accused of the arousal.
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Measuring Aggression
Measuring aggression in the laboratory with human participants presents specific
challenges to the researcher. One difficulty is that many of the techniques that have been
developed rely on deception and/or concealment of the focus and methods of the study from the
participant. Another difficulty is that the experimenter (or confederate) cannot be subjected to
physical or emotional harm over the course of the experiment. In an effort to overcome these
challenges and minimize the risk and harm done to the participant, researchers have developed
clever ways to measure aggression in the lab.
One of the earliest methods used to elicit aggression from participants was devised by
Arnold Buss (1961): the Buss Aggression Machine. In this experimental method, the participant
signs up for a “teaching-learning” experiment. Upon arrival, the participant is assigned to the
role of “teacher” and is instructed to correct the mistakes of another participant (a confederate)
using electric shocks (in reality, no shocks are administered to the confederate). The participant
is allowed to choose the magnitude of the shocks, either a low amperage (less painful) or higher
amperage (more painful) shock. The magnitude the participant chooses is considered a
measurement of their level of aggression. The procedure has been modified by subsequent
researchers to use various stimuli in place of electrical shocks, such as blasts of loud noise, or
measuring how long they hold down the button to administer the punishing stimulus (Berkowitz,
1993).
Another commonly used procedure is the Taylor Aggression Paradigm (Taylor, 1967). In
this method, participants are informed they are competing against another participant in a
competitive reaction time game. If they “win” the trial, they get to administer a shock to the
other participant (who does not actually exist). If they lose the trial, they receive a shock
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(supposedly administered from the other participant). As with the Buss aggression procedure,
aggression is operationalized as the magnitude of shock the participant chooses to administer to
the competitor.
Although both of these procedures are the most widely-used, they are often criticized for
lacking face validity (Ritter & Eslea, 2005; Tedeschi & Quigley, 1996; but also see Giancola &
Chermack, 1998). Several other procedures have been used to measure aggression in laboratory
settings. These have included giving participants an opportunity to subtract points from an
opponent’s score (Cherek, 1981), asking participants to designate a quantity of hot sauce for
another person to eat (Lieberman et al., 1999) and more “real-world” tasks such as suggesting a
trainee be hired or fired after interacting with the person during the experiment (Kulik & Brown,
1979; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006; Zillman & Cantor, 1976).
However, as noted by Berkowitz (1993) just because physiological arousal and anger
occur does not necessitate an aggressive outburst. Various situational factors can cause us to
restrain our aggressive impulses. If a person is able to remain anonymous, and therefore avoid
any punishment or social disgrace that could result from acting aggressively, oftentimes they will
behave more aggressively than if they were individuated. Zimbardo (1969) had participants
interact with an obnoxious confederate and gave the participant an opportunity to punish the
confederate by administering electrical shocks. In one condition, the women wore lab coats with
hoods, thereby masking their identity. In the other condition, the women were “individuated” –
they did not wear cloaks, but instead wore large nametags and were told the experimenter was
interested in their individual responses. Participants who were given the cloak of anonymity
shocked the confederate twice as long as those who were individuated.
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Duval and Wicklund (1972) proposed that self-awareness motivates individuals to behave
more in line with their personal standards. If individuals oppose aggressive behavior, drawing
attention to their self (e.g. having them look in a mirror while performing the experiment) can
reduce aggressive impulses; but if participants are inherently disposed to aggression, the selfawareness can actually increase aggressive behavior (Carver, 1975).
Much of the experimental evidence seems to indicate that executive functioning and selfawareness can influence the aggressive behavior of a person, but very little research explicitly
examines the connection between the self, executive functioning, and aggressive behavior. The
purpose of the proposed experiments is to examine these relationships; specifically, when an
individual has discrepant self-esteem, how does an ego threat affect their executive functioning?
If it is the case that a threat depletes executive resources, this may potentially decrease the
individual’s ability to inhibit aggressive impulses, thereby increasing the aggressiveness of the
individual toward the source of the insult.
Psychophysiology
Basic Principles and Methods
Questionnaires, surveys and observing outward behavior are common methods for
quantifying variables of interest to psychologists, but recently Psychology has begun to overlap
more with Biology in attempts to explain and predict behavior. Molecular and invasive
techniques are available for use on animals, but ethical standards usually preclude their use on
human participants. Attempts to measure biological and physiological variables have been
undertaken by a branch of psychology called psychophysiology. Through measuring changes in
somatic states, such as electrodermal activity (sweating), heart rate, electromyography, brain
waves (electroencephalography), hormones, and most recently functional magnetic resonance
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imaging (fMRI), psychophysiologists attempt to infer changes in mental state from changes in
bodily responses. For the purposes of this paper, cardiovascular responses and circulating
hormone levels will be discussed.
Cardiovascular Reactivity
The cardiovascular system consists of the heart, the blood and the intricate system of
veins, arteries and capillaries that carry blood to every organ of the body.
As physical demands necessitate, blood flow to particular regions can increase or decrease, and,
of interest to psychologists, changes in the cardiovascular system can also occur as the result of
psychological processes. As a fluid system, the most obvious changes that occur are often
reflected in changes in hydrostatic pressure within the system. Blood pressure is a complex
phenomenon; a combination of the rate and pressure at which the heart is pumping, and the
resistance that is occurring within the veins and arteries (Martini, Ober, Garrison, Welch, &
Hutchings, 1998). Measuring arterial pressure results in two readings. The first, systolic
pressure, is a point of high pressure; the result of constriction of the ventricle pushing the blood
into the arteries. The second, diastolic pressure, occurs when the ventricle has relaxed before
starting the cycle once again.
The cardiovascular system receives innervation from both the sympathetic (SNS) and
parasympathetic (PNS) branches of the autonomic nervous system. The overall heart rate is the
result of a combination of both branches of innervation, each working against the other. Both
systems originate in the cardiac centers of the medulla oblongata, but take different routes and
have different levels of influence on cardiac activity. Sympathetic innervation is accomplished
through ganglia in the lower cervical and thoracic level, whereas parasympathetic innervation is
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carried via the vagus nerve (CN X). Although PNS may have the more direct route, the heart
receives significantly greater innervation from the SNS (Martini et al., 1998).
Cortisol
Traditional measures of psychophysiology (heart rate, skin conductance,
electromyography) are adept at recording changes in physiology that can occur in seconds, but
there are also changes that can occur over the course of minutes. When an organism experiences
stress, one of the most robust physiological changes that can occur is activation of the
hypothalamic-pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis. The HPA axis involves a cascade of hormone events
that culminate in the release of cortisol from the adrenal cortex. Following release of cortisol
from the adrenal cortex, it then circulates through the bloodstream and can be monitored through
blood or saliva assay. The average time from perception of a stressful event to peak cortisol
levels ranges from 20 to 40 minutes (Dickerson & Kemeney, 2002).
In addition to the slower time course of cortisol reactivity, the baseline levels of cortisol
also vary with circadian rhythms (Kirschbaum & Hellhammer, 1989; Weitzmann et al., 1971).
Generally, cortisol levels tend to be highest in the morning upon waking and steadily decrease
during the day. Because levels are higher in the morning and therefore closer to the ceiling,
some studies have reported greater cortisol reactivity (i.e. changes in response to some stimulus –
stress, corticotropin releasing hormone, insulin injection) in the morning than in the afternoon
(Copinschi et al., 1983; DeCherney et al., 1985; Schulte et al., 1985), but more recent studies
have not been able to find any differences in reliability of the cortisol response based on time of
day (Galliven et al., 1997; Kudielka, Schommer, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 2004).
Since cortisol was first recognized by Hans Selye (1956) as an important contributor to
the stress response, multiple theories have been advanced that suggest different contexts where
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the HPA axis may become activated (for an extensive review, see Dickerson & Kemeney, 2004).
Whereas the eliciting stimuli may be debatable, the physiological role of cortisol is better
understood. When activated for short periods of time, cortisol fulfills a role of energy release: it
stimulates gluconeogenesis in the liver and fatty tissue, mobilizing energy for immediate use in a
stressful environment. However, if the HPA axis remains chronically activated it can have
deleterious effects, including immunosupression (Cohen, 1989, Schwarttzman & Cidlowski,
1993; McEwen et al., 1997), hippocampal deterioration (Diamond, Bennet, Flshner, & Rose,
1992; Pavlides, Watanabe, & McEwen, 1993), and the health and memory deficits that
accompany such changes in the body (Sapolsky, 1996; Sapolsky, Romero, & Munck, 2000).
Central to many theories of HPA activation is the presence of a threat to the organism
(Dickerson et al., 2004; Blascovitch & Tomaka, 1996; Sapolsky, et al., 2000). Dickerson and
colleagues have proposed that the HPA axis is part of a self-preservation system, the role of
which is to “[monitor] the environment, for threats to one’s social esteem or social status and
[coordinate] psychological, physiological and behavioral responses to cope with such threats.”
Indeed, the relationship between social-evaluative threat conditions and cortisol responding is a
large effect (d = 0.67; Dickerson et al., 2004).
Although self-esteem plays a central role in the self-preservation theory proposed by
Dickerson et al., there is a small amount of research on the relationship between self-esteem and
cortisol reactivity in humans. In one study, Pruessner, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum (1999)
presented participants with a difficult task and gave them success or failure feedback. There was
no relationship between self-esteem and cortisol levels, except in the condition where
participants were told they had failed at the experimental task. When failure feedback was
administered, participants with lower self-esteem experienced a lower sense of control resulting
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in a heightened cortisol response. One important aspect to note is that self-esteem was only
measured with an explicit measure. The present study will examine the role that implicit selfesteem could play in predicting a heightened cortisol response, and how this response can affect
an individual’s working memory capabilities.
In a study of depressed individuals, Scarpa & Luscher (2002) had participants complete
an uncontrollable laboratory task – participants were exposed to bursts of white noise and told
they could stop the noises if they pressed the correct button sequence...which did not exist. The
authors found that individuals with low explicit self-esteem, cortisol reactivity did not predict
depressive severity, but for individuals with higher self-esteem, cortisol reactivity was positively
correlated with depressive symptoms. This interaction was mediated by perceptions of
controllability: the less controllable the task was perceived as, the greater was the cortisol
response. This relationship of cortisol reactivity and feeling a lack of control over the situation
fits nicely with the theory of threat vs. challenge appraisal, presented below.
Threat vs. Challenge Responses
In recent years, some interesting work has been done by Blascovich and Tomaka (1996)
on how cognitive appraisals can differentially affect physiological responses to events. The
authors propose a biopsychosocial model that considers not only the affect an individual
experiences in a given situation, but how that affect interacts with the individual’s cognitive
processes. Central to their theory is the concept of resource demands: if an individual perceives
that he or she does not possess the ability to meet the demands of a task, they will experience this
situation as threatening and will show activation of the HPA axis. However, if the individual
does appraise the situation as one for which they possess the ability to meet demands, they will
show activation of the sympathetic adrenal-medullary (SAM) axis. Physiologically, threat and
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challenge show a different pattern of responding. Threat increases cardiac contractility, but
because the HPA activation blocks release of epinephrine from the adrenal medulla, there is no
change in blood pressure or heart rate (Blascovitch & Mendes, 2000). Because the HPA axis
becomes activated, this should result in an increase in salivary cortisol levels, although no
published studies have yet examined this effect. Challenge, by activating the SAM axis, shows a
different physiological response, which is marked by an increase in blood pressure and heart rate
(Esler, Jennings, & Lambert, 1989; Tomaka, Blascovich, Kibler, & Ernst, 1997). Again, no
studies to date have examined the effect this response may have on salivary cortisol, but due to
the lack of activation of the HPA axis, there should not be a noticeable increase in salivary
cortisol levels.
In a series of studies, Tomaka et al. (1997) tested the cognitive appraisal theory against
the peripheralist idea that attributions rely on physiological responses. In the first experiment,
the authors presented participants with sets of mental arithmetic problems. Half of the
participants received instructions that emphasized the task as a challenge – “do your best” – and
the remaining subjects received instructions that presented the task as a threat – “responses will
be scored for speed and accuracy.” Psychophysiological responses (heart rate, blood pressure,
impedance cardiography and electrocardiographic responses) were recorded during the task.
Participants who received challenge instructions and reported seeing the task as a challenge
experienced physiological reactions indicative of a challenge response, marked by increased
sympathetic activation but decreased (or unchanged) peripheral resistance. Participants who
received threat instructions also showed activation of the sympathetic nervous system, but
showed increased peripheral resistance. In a second experiment, the authors manipulated the
physiological activity of participants to make it resemble that of a challenge or threat response
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(e.g., riding a stationary bike, or performing a cold-pressor task). They found that physiological
activity itself was not sufficient to cause the individual to appraise a situation as threatening or
challenging. However, in each of these experiments, circulating cortisol levels were not
measured and were merely inferred through the use of cardiography measures.
Subsequent studies have shown that these challenge and threat physiological reactions are
sensitive to social interactions. When interacting with a stigmatized individual, participants
showed an increase in threat physiology (i.e. increase in heart rate coupled with an increase in
blood pressure), which in turn decreased performance on a word-finding task. Alternately,
participants interacting with a nonstigmatized individual exhibited challenge physiology (i.e.,
increase in heart rate without an increase in blood pressure), which did not interfere with
performance on a word-finding task (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001).
To date, no studies have examined potential relationships between threat vs. challenge
physiology and aggression. Additionally, a literature review did not identify any studies to date
that have examined the relationship between appraisals of threat or challenge and cortisol
reactivity in humans.
A separate line of research has studied the relationship between anxiety and working
memory using the framework of processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007). Processing efficiency is conceptualized as the level of
performance a participant performs at relative to the amount of mental resources the participant
has to devote to the task at hand (i.e. a participant who can perform well while using very few
cognitive resources is said to be cognitively efficient). The theory uses Baddeley’s (1986) model
of working memory as a foundation and assumes that the cognitive resources that are influenced
by anxiety are limited primarily to the central executive (Eysenck et al., 2007). The primary
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effects of anxiety, the authors propose, are a decrease in performance on attentional control – the
ability to focus on a desired task – because the threatening situation of stimuli begin to drain
attentional resources. Evidence for these theories come from studies showing that anxious
participants use additional effort to boost performance in the face of decreased processing
efficiency, and these decreases in performance become more pronounced as they increasingly
rely on the central executive (for review, see Eysenck et al., 2007). The anxiety experienced by
a participant also can be detrimental to their ability to inhibit unwanted responses. Increased
anxiety and stress impair performance on the Stroop task (Pallak, Pittman, Heller, & Munson,
1975; Hochman, 1969).
The neural substrate associated with this anxiety-performance relationship has been
hypothesized to be in the right prefrontal cortex (Shackman, et al., 2006). Processing of
approach and withdrawal-related emotions is thought to occur in the left and right prefrontal
cortices, respectively (Coan & Allen, 2003, 2004; Davidson, 1994). Given that anxiety is largely
a negative emotional state, Shackman and colleagues (2006) hypothesized that anxiety would
more significantly impair executive processes involving the right (withdrawal) hemisphere. The
authors asked participants to complete two three-item n-back tasks (the participant was shown a
series of stimuli and asked to press a button if a stimulus matched a stimulus three back in the
series). One of the tasks used a verbal (left hemisphere) format in which the participant was
asked to identify if the same letter had appeared three back. The other task used a spatial (right
hemisphere) task, composed of a box that appeared at different locations on the screen. The
participant was asked to identify if it appeared at the same location as it had three back in the
series. In addition to performing the tasks, the researchers recorded acoustic startle EMG and
corrugator activity, and, to invoke a state of anxiety, participants were told they would receive
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electric shocks at various times throughout the experiment. The results revealed a dissociation in
task performance: verbal working memory remained intact, regardless of how much anxiety the
participant experienced – but spatial working memory was significantly impaired during states of
anxiety. While the results are impressive, in reality participants are not often exposed to
situations where they may be subjected to electric shocks. Therefore, the present study will
attempt to examine the effect ego-threatening feedback has on the anxiety/threat response of a
participant without the use or suggestion of electric shock.
The present study will use cardiovascular recording and cortisol assays to attempt to
assess the level of anxiety/threat a participant experiences when presented with failure feedback.
No studies to date have examined the role that implicit self-esteem may play in predicting the
response an individual has to a challenging versus threatening environment. Assuming that
participants with discrepant (high explicit, low implicit) self-esteem have a heightened threat
response (increased blood pressure and heart rate, and cortisol reactivity), the present study will
also examine the effects this has on subsequent working memory and response inhibition tasks.
The Present Study
Given that negative feelings make an individual more prone to aggressive outbursts, it
seems intuitive that if an individual feels badly about himself or herself (low self-esteem), this
would make the person more prone to aggress. Indeed, this was the dominant theory for a
potential link between self-esteem and aggression for nearly a decade (Oates & Forrest, 1985;
Schoenfeld, 1988; Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). After reviewing the literature on selfesteem and aggression, however, Baumeister et al. (1996) proposed that it is high self-esteem
individuals who are prone to aggressive outbursts. The reason for this, the authors propose, is
that individuals with high self-esteem have more of an opportunity for threats to the ego. Kernis
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(1993) has been particularly interested in how levels of self-esteem can change over time, and
proposed that individuals who have highly variable levels of self-esteem may be especially
sensitive to feedback. Consistent with this hypothesis, Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry, and Harlow
(1993) found that negative feedback caused defensive reactions in individuals with high selfesteem, if the esteem was unstable over time.
Bushman and Baumeister (1998) examined the self-esteem-aggression relationship and
found no relationship between self-esteem and aggression in response to an ego challenge.
However, individuals who scored high on a scale of narcissism did react more aggressively
toward the individual who provided the insult. In the experiment, self-esteem was only
measured using an explicit measure (the Rosenberg scale), and modern conceptions of selfesteem suggest that self-esteem can either be secure or fragile (Zeigler-Hill, 2006). Insecure
self-esteem, as discussed above, can be measured in different ways, such as measuring selfesteem stability (Kernis et al., 1993), or discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem
(for review see Kernis & Paradise, 2002). In a second experiment, the authors investigated the
role of perceived threat (as indicated by self-report) and found that threat mediated the
relationship between narcissism and aggression. The present study will assess insecure selfesteem by utilizing a measure of implicit self-esteem.
Interestingly, as noted earlier, implicit self-esteem can have significant effects on
individuals who are high in explicit self-esteem: they score higher on measures of narcissism
(Jordan et al., 2003; Zeigler-Hill, 2006), fail to self-regulate after negative feedback (Lambird &
Mann, 2006), are more negative to outgroup members (Jordan, et al., 2005; Kernis et al., 2005),
and show more unrealistic optimism than individuals with secure self-esteem (Bosson, et al,
2003). To date, no studies have examined defensive self-esteem (high explicit, low implicit) as it
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may relate to aggression. However, if negative mood states and threatening cognitive appraisals
can reduce mental resources, and those are the same resources that are needed to inhibit an
aggressive response, it would seem that individuals with fragile self-esteem may be more prone
to an aggressive response if negative affect is aroused.
Therefore, the present study will examine the relationships between self-esteem (implicit
vs. explicit) and aggression when an individual is presented with an ego threat. The relationship
between self-esteem and aggression has consistently been shown to be small, and possibly
nonexistent, but this relationship has only been examined with explicit self-esteem measures.
Recent findings on the importance of implicit attitudes highlight the impact they may have on
narcissism (Zeigler-Hill, 2006), prejudice (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005), and anger
suppression (Schroder-Abe, Rudolph, & Schuz, 2007). Therefore, it is possible that the absence
of a link between self-esteem and aggression thus far has been because experiments have failed
to distinguish between secure and insecure self-esteem. The proposed experiment will attempt to
circumvent this outcome through the perspective of self-esteem as a heterogeneous phenomenon.
The primary hypothesis of this proposal is that individuals with insecure self-esteem will
respond to an ego threat with a physiological threat response (increased blood pressure/heart rate
and a larger level of cortisol reactivity), and this will have the result of diminishing working
memory. This depletion of executive resources will make the individual less able to inhibit
aggressive impulses, thereby resulting in increased aggression. Individuals with secure selfesteem, however, will not experience a threat so much as a threat because implicitly they do not
harbor self-doubt. Therefore, threatening feedback will not make their implicit attitude salient
and will not deplete working memory, nor increase aggression.

CHAPTER TWO: METHOD
A series of three experiments will be conducted, each testing separate relationships
within the model (Figure 1). Experiment 1 will examine how discrepancies between implicit and
explicit self-esteem affect physiological threat/challenge responses, and the impact physiological
changes have on working memory capacity. Experiment 2 will examine the relationship between
self-esteem, ego threat and inhibitory ability, and the role these constructs play in preventing
aggressive behavior. Experiment 3 will examine the relationship between threat physiology,
working memory capacity and inhibitory control. Specifically, does a physiological threat
response deplete working memory capacity, thereby making an individual less able to inhibit
responses?
Experiment 1
Previous research (e.g. Schmader et al., 2003) has attempted to examine how perceived
threat can affect working memory, but no studies to date have examined the physiological
responses and individual differences that may mediate this relationship. This experiment will
examine how failure feedback may interact with self-esteem discrepancies to predict
physiological threat responses (Figure 2). Additionally, the effect these responses have on
working memory will be examined. It is predicted that individuals with discrepant self-esteem
will show physiological responses congruent with threat responses to failure feedback, and this
physiology will be associated with lower working memory capacity.
Participants
A review of previous literature identified the relationship between negative feedback and
physiological reactivity was the smallest effect in the model (Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, &
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Fahey, 2004; Cohen’s d = .65, a large effect). A power analysis of this effect determined that 94
participants would be required to detect the effect (Soper, 2009). The present study included 116
individuals (47 men) enrolled in an introductory Psychology course at Georgia State University
(ages 18-30, mean = 20.2 years old). Participants were asked not to eat, smoke, exercise, or
consume low pH beverages for at least one hour prior to the beginning of the experiment.
Compliance was assessed by asking participants to report the last time they ate, drank or smoked
after obtaining informed consent. At the end of the study, participants were asked to guess the
motive of the experiment. One participant was excluded for correctly guessing the experiment
was attempting to measure reactions to feedback. Three individuals reported having recently ate,
and therefore did not supply saliva. Eight participants did not supply sufficient saliva at either
baseline or at the end of the experiment and therefore cortisol levels were unable to be
quantified. One participant aborted the experiment early due to equipment failure and therefore
her data were not included. In total, the final number of participants in the experiment was 103
(49 in the threat condition, 54 in the challenge condition). However, this was primarily due to
loss of saliva data. For analyses that did not include cortisol, 114 participants were included
(116 minus the participant who suspected the purpose of the experiment, and the participant lost
due to equipment failure).
Procedure
Personality Questionnaires. Explicit self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg SelfEsteem Scale (α = .88, Dobson, Goudy, Keith, & Powers, 1979; test-retest reliability = .85,
Silber & Tippett, 1965) (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). The RSES is a ten-item questionnaire that
asks participants how much they agree with statements such as “I take a positive attitude towards
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myself” and “At times I feel like I am no good at all” (reverse scored). Participants respond with
one of four responses (strongly agree to strongly disagree).
Psychophysiology. Following the completion of the questionnaires, the experimenter
returned to the room and the participant was given a small Salivette swab (Sartstedt,
Rommelsdorf, Germany) in which to collect a saliva sample. The cotton sampling device was
kept in the mouth for approximately 2 minutes. During this time, the experimenter administered
a blood pressure and heart rate reading from the participant’s left brachial artery using an
automated sphygnomanometer (Omron Healthcare, Bannockburn, Illinois) while the participant
remained seated. The participant was instructed to place the cotton saliva collection gauze
directly into the test tube without using their fingers, and all samples were frozen (approximately
-20 C°) until analysis.
Baseline Working Memory. Following completion of the physiological measurements,
participants completed the Operation Span Task (OST; La Pointe & Engle, 1991; Turner &
Engle, 1989), which involves memorizing single-syllable words for later recall while
concurrently evaluating whether mathematical equations are correct or incorrect. Each equation
consists of (a) multiplication or division, (b) addition or subtraction, and (c) a solution (e.g. Is (5
x 2) – 3 = 7?). Participants are asked to indicate “yes” or “no” regarding whether or not the
solution is correct, and are then shown a word for two seconds. Sets of equation-word pairs vary
in length, between two and five stimuli per set. Following the conclusion of the set, the
participant is shown “???” and they write down all the words they can remember from that set in
the same order they were shown. Working memory capacity is quantified as the number of
words the participant correctly recalls from each set divided by the total number of sets. This
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measure has been widely used and demonstrates acceptable reliability and consistency (α = .78,
test-retest = .83, Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005).
Implicit Association Task. After completing the working memory task, the experimenter
introduced the next computer task and explained that the computer would automatically run the
task. The task consisted of the Implicit Association Task (IAT; test-retest reliability = .69;
Bosson, Swann & Pennebaker, 2000; Greenwald, et al., 1998, α = .88, Bosson et al., 2000).
Participants are shown words in the center of the screen and asked to respond as quickly as
possible. Category labels appear in the upper left and right corners of the screen, and
participants are instructed to use the “d” and “k” buttons to categorize stimuli into the two
categories. There were seven blocks of trials, five of which (1, 2, 3, 5 and 6) were practice. The
first block asks participants to categorize stimuli as good or bad. The second block asks them to
categorize stimuli as self or other. Blocks 3 and 4 add the two categories together: if the stimuli
is good or self it will be one side, if the stimulus is bad or other it will go to the other side.
Blocks 6 and 7 are similar, but link bad and self on one side, with good and other on the right.
IAT latencies are calculated using Blocks 4 and 7 only. At the end of the task, the computer
automatically returned a screen that read “Score: 193. Please tell the experimenter you are
finished.”
Praise/Failure Feedback. The experimenter then returned to the room and delivered
either positive or negative feedback, randomly assigned by a coin toss before the experiment
began. Positive feedback consisted of the experimenter seeing the score and replying in a
cheerful tone “Wow! Great job, that’s a good score! Ok, let’s go on to the next task.” Negative
feedback included the experimenter returning to the room, seeing the score and replying in a
disgusted tone “Ugh, that’s kind of a low score. Well, let’s just go on to the next task.”
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Post-manipulation Working Memory. Following the feedback, the participant completed
the automated version of the operation span (OPSPAN; LaPointe & Engle, 1990). In this
version, the participant is shown a math problem without an answer at the end (e.g., 4 + 6 = ?)
and asked to compute the answer to the problem. After thinking of the answer, the equation is
removed from the screen and replaced by a number, along with a box marked “True” and a box
marked “False.” If the number is the answer to the problem, the participant clicks “True,” but if
it is not the correct answer, the participant clicks “False.” When the box is clicked, the screen is
cleared and a letter appears on the screen. That is the letter the participant is to remember for the
recall portion of the experiment. After a number of equations and letters, a recall screen is
shown which has a grid of 16 letters. The participant is asked to click on the letters he/she was
shown, in the order they were presented, and to click “Exit” when he/she is finished. Following
this, the participant is given immediate feedback by the computer on how many letters they
correctly recalled, the number of math problems they correctly solved, and the overall percentage
of math problems that were correct for the entire experiment. Participants were instructed to
keep their overall math performance above 85% “because we only use the data for people who
score above 85%.”
Post-Manipulation Physiology & Aggression Measures. Following the completion of the
automated OPSPAN task (approximately 20 minutes), the experimenter obtained another blood
pressure and heart rate reading from the participant’s left brachial artery using an automated
sphygmomanometer, and saliva sample using a new Salivette swab which was kept in the mouth
for two minutes. Participants were then asked to complete an “experimenter evaluation form”
(Appendix A). The feedback form is considered the measure of aggression, as low ratings of the
experimenter could endanger the individual’s job. To strengthen the cover story, participants
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were asked to seal the evaluation in the envelope and place the envelope into a locked box
labeled “Experimenter Evaluations.” Before debriefing, participants were asked to guess what
the experiment was measuring, and to rate the praise/failure feedback on a scale of 1 (not at all
believable) to 4 (totally believable). Participants were then debriefed.
Results
Data Analysis Strategy. In the proposal for this series of experiments, it was
hypothesized that a moderated mediation approach would be best-suited to analyzing the data.
However, moderated mediation requires a series of significant pathways (either directly, or
indirectly; Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005) in order to test for mediation, and moderation of the
mediation. Unfortunately in the experiments below, there were few significant relationships
between the constructs of interest. Therefore, tests for mediation were unable to be performed.
As a result, more appropriate statistical measures (MANOVA, hierarchical linear regression,
logistic regression) were utilized to examine relationships between the variables.
Data Screening. Each variable was examined for normality and outliers by viewing box
plots and q-q plots of the data. Baseline working memory was normally distributed (M = .74, SD
= .09). One value was identified as an outlier (greater than 3 standard deviations lower than
mean) and was removed from the dataset. Post-manipulation working memory exhibited
negative skew and was therefore transformed by reflecting the distribution (multiplying by -1
and adding a constant) and taking the square root of each value.
Implicit Association Task reaction time data were processed according to the procedures
outlined in Greenwald and Farnham (2000). All responses less than 300 ms were recoded to 300
ms and responses greater than 3,000 ms were recoded to 3,000 ms. Reaction time data were log
transformed (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000) and the first two trials for each block were
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deleted. Means were then calculated for each block, and the self-negative block was subtracted
from the self-positive block yielding a latency score. Thus, positive scores indicate higher selfpositive associations and higher implicit self-esteem whereas negative scores indicate stronger
associations between self-words and negative adjectives (M = .07, SD = .06).
Saliva samples were stored in a chest freezer at approximately -20 C within 4 hours of
collection, and were kept frozen until analysis (up to three months later). Cortisol levels were
quantified by radioimmunoassay (Coat-a-Count Cortisol I125 immunoassay kit; Siemens
Medical Solutions Diagnostics, Los Angeles, CA). All samples were run in the same assay (M =
7.88, SD = 3.75, intra-assay precision 2.28%, r = .99, sensitivity = 0.12-113.11 nmol/L,
Specificity: Cortisol 100%, 11-Deoxycortisol 11.4% and less than 1% for all other related
compounds). Time of day was controlled for by running all participants in the afternoon to
account for circadian differences in baseline cortisol levels. Mean arterial pressure (MAP) was
computed by the equation (2 x diastolic pressure + systolic pressure)/3) based on the blood
pressure readings obtained from the sphymomanometer (M = 82.34, SD = 9.17). Descriptive
statistics for each variable are shown in Table 1.
Manipulation check. In order to confirm that the experimental manipulation of negative
vs. positive feedback had the desired effect on experimenter ratings, a Mann-Whitney U test was
conducted to compare the ratings across groups. The Mann-Whitney U test was chosen due to
the extreme skew in the data (transformations were unsuccessful at removing the skew).
Therefore, parametric statistics were inappropriate to compare groups. Individuals who received
failure feedback rated the experimenter lower (M = 34.62, n = 56) than individuals who received
positive feedback (M = 35.22, n = 58), U = 1361, z = -2.33, p < .05, r2 = .04 (4% of the variance,
a medium effect, Cohen, 1988).
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Hypothesis 1: Following negative feedback, discrepant self-esteem will be associated
with physiological threat responses (i.e., increases in cortisol but not mean arterial pressure)
whereas secure self-esteem will be associated with challenge responses (i.e., increases in blood
pressure, but not cortisol levels).
Effect of feedback on physiological measures. A one-way between-groups multivariate
analysis of covariance was performed to investigate differences in physiological reactivity
between feedback conditions. Two dependent variables were used: post-task mean-arterial
pressure (MAP; (2 x diastolic pressure + systolic pressure)/3) and post-task cortisol levels.
Baseline MAP and cortisol levels were entered as covariates, and feedback was entered as the
between-subject variable. Preliminary testing for the assumptions of normality, linearity,
univarite and multivariate outliers, as well as homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and
multicollinearity were conducted. Two participants were identified as outliers (Mahalanobis
distances > 13.82) and were therefore excluded from the analyses. There was a nonsignificant
trend toward a difference between positive and negative feedback conditions on the composite
physiological dependent variables, F (2, 97) = 2.84, p = .06; Wilks’ Lambda = .95; pη2 = .06
(6% of the variance, a medium effect). An inspection of the mean scores indicated that
individuals in the negative feedback condition showed higher levels of post-manipulation
cortisol (M = 8.62, SD = 4.45) than individuals who received positive feedback (M = 7.45, SD =
3.80), as well as higher MAP values (negative feedback: M = 85.63, SD = 10.41; positive
feedback: M = 84.45, SD = 9.82).
Self-esteem as a predictor of physiological reactivity. Separate hierarchical regressions
were performed to examine the effect of feedback and self-esteem on cortisol and MAP
reactivity. Hierarchical regression was chosen in order to partition variance between main
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effects and interactions between feedback and self-esteem in predicting physiology. Baseline
values were entered in a preliminary step to act as a covariate. Regressing post-experiment
cortisol values on feedback type, implicit and explicit self-esteem accounted for a significant
portion of variance, Fchange (3, 97) = 2.73, p < .05, R2change = .05 (5% of the variance, a medium
effect; Table 2). One main-effect was present in the first step: individuals who received negative
feedback had greater increases in cortisol levels than individuals who received positive feedback,
b = -.70, t = -2.27, p < .05, pr2 = .03 (3% of the variance, a small effect). There was also a trend
such that higher explicit self-esteem was marginally associated with greater cortisol reactivity, b
= .64, t = 1.80, p = .07, pr2 = .02 (2% of the variance, a small effect). Implicit self-esteem was
not related to cortisol reactivity, b = .92, t = .18, p = .85, pr2 = .00. Second-order interactions did
not account for any additional variance, Fchange (3, 94) = .00, p = 1.00, R2change = .00, including
the interaction between implicit self-esteem and feedback, b = -.55, t = -.10, p = .91, pr2 = .00,
and the interaction between implicit and explicit self-esteem, b = -.20, t = -.03, p = .97, pr2 = .00.
The three-way interaction term between implicit self-esteem, implicit self-esteem and feedback
was insignificant, Fchange (1, 93) = .03, p = .87, R2change = .00.
A separate hierarchical regression was conducted to examine the relationships between
feedback, explicit and implicit self-esteem on mean arterial pressure reactivity (MAP; Table 3).
Again, hierarchical regression was used to examine the effects of the variables on mean arterial
pressure. There were no main effects nor interactions that significantly accounted for the
variance in mean arterial pressure scores, although there was a trend towards individuals who
received negative feedback exhibiting higher mean arterial pressure, b = -.90, t = -1.79, p = .08,
pr2 = .01 (a small effect). Implicit self-esteem did not predict MAP reactivity, b = -8.40, t = -.99,
p = .32, pr2 = .00, did not interact with explicit self-esteem, b = -10.63, t = -.18, p = .34, pr2 =
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.00, and did not interact with feedback when predicting MAP reactivity, b = 2.71, t = .31, p =
.75, pr2 = .00. The third step included the three-way interaction term between feedback, implicit
self-esteem and explicit self-esteem, and was nonsignificant, Fchange (1, 104) = .00, p = .96,
R2change = .00.
Hypothesis 2: In response to negative feedback, physiological threat responses will
predict decreases in working memory from baseline while physiological challenge responses will
predict an increase in working memory capacity.
Effect of physiological changes on working memory. A hierarchical regression was
conducted to examine the relationships between feedback, physiology and working memory
(Table 4). Baseline working memory score, baseline cortisol level and baseline MAP were
entered in the first step as covariates. In the following step, post-task MAP, cortisol levels and
feedback type were entered and did not account for a significant portion of variance, Fchange (3,
93) = .913, p = .44, R2change = .02. In a third step, two-way interaction terms were entered and
again did not account for a significant portion of variance, Fchange (3, 90) = .03, p = .99, R2change =
.00, and the final step included the three-way interaction term between MAP, cortisol and
feedback, Fchange (1, 89) = .79, p = .38, R2change = .01.
Hypothesis 3: In response to negative feedback, physiological threat responses will be
associated with aggression toward the experimenter.
Physiology and Aggression. There was an extreme amount of negative skew in the
ratings of the experimenter such that the majority of participants rated the experimenter the
maximum rating possible. Transformations were not successful at reducing the skew, and
therefore experimenter ratings were binned into a binary variable for logistic regression analysis.
Participants who did not penalize the experimenter on any rating item (i.e. giving the
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experimenter a perfect score of 36) were coded as 0 (“no aggression”). Scores of 0-35 were
recoded as 1 (“became aggressive”).
Binary logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of cortisol, mean arterial
pressure and feedback on the likelihood that participants would give the experimenter a lessthan-perfect rating (SPSS 17.0, Chicago, IL; Tabachnick & Fiddell, 2007). The model contained
the three variables, their two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction, which were entered
in three steps in a hierarchical regression. Baseline mean arterial pressure and cortisol values
were entered in a preliminary step to act as covariates. The full model containing all predictors
was statistically significant, χ2 (9, N = 115) = 21.62, p < .01, indicating that the model was able
to distinguish between participants who penalized the experimenter from those who did not. The
model as a whole explained between 18.9% (Cox and Snell R2) and 27.4% (Nagelkerke R2) of
the variance in experimenter ratings and correctly classified 79.6% of the cases. As shown in
Table 5, three variables made a unique significant contribution to the model: feedback condition,
feedback x mean arterial pressure change, and the interaction between cortisol and mean arterial
pressure. The strongest predictor of aggression was feedback type, recording an odds ratio of
3.40, such that individuals in the negative feedback condition were 3.4 times more likely to
penalize the experimenter.
In order to examine the interaction between MAP and cortisol changes in predicting
aggression, a separate logistic regression was conducted for only participants in the negative
feedback condition. The full model containing all predictors (baseline MAP and cortisol values,
post-manipulation MAP and cortisol values, and MAP x cortisol) was statistically significant, χ2
(5, N = 49) = 18.34, p < .01, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between
participants who penalized the experimenter from those who did not. The model as a whole
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explained between 31.2% (Cox and Snell R2) and 42.7% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in
experimenter ratings and correctly classified 77.6% of the cases.
Values +/- 1 SD of each variable were inserted into the regression equation in order to
examine the interaction (Figure 3). Individuals with cortisol and MAP values that both increased
one standard deviation above the mean had a 1% probability of being categorized as aggressive,
as did individuals whose cortisol and MAP values both rose less than one standard deviation.
Individuals whose cortisol values rose one standard deviation greater than the mean, but whose
MAP values rose one standard deviation below the mean, were 52% likely to be categorized as
aggressive. Individuals whose cortisol values rose one standard deviation less than the mean, but
whose MAP values increased one standard deviation above the mean, had a 99% probability of
being categorized as aggressive1.
Threat and Challenge. PANAS items reflecting threat were selected to index measures
of threat (see Appendix B; α = .90), as were items to reflect challenge (α = .86).

In order to

confirm that an increase in blood pressure without a concurrent increase in cortisol was evidence
of a challenge appraisal, post-experiment ratings of challenge items on the PANAS were
regressed on MAP and cortisol scores for individuals in the negative feedback condition. The
interaction between cortisol and MAP showed a nonsignificant trend toward individuals’ feelings
of challenge (after controlling for baseline cortisol, MAP and challenge ratings; Fchange (1, 42) =
3.91, p = .06, R2change = .03, 3% of the variance, a small effect).
Similarly, in order to confirm that an increase in cortisol without a concurrent increase in
blood pressure was indicative of increased feelings of threat, post experiment ratings of threat

1

An alternative model was examined using only implicit self-esteem (without explicit selfesteem). Results are discussed in Appendix 3.
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items on the PANAS were regressed on MAP and cortisol scores for individuals in the negative
feedback condition, after controlling for baseline feelings of threat, MAP and cortisol levels.
The interaction between cortisol and MAP did not predict feelings of threat: Fchange (1, 42) = .29,
p = .53, R2change = .01.
Self-Esteem, Working Memory and Aggression. The relationship between self-esteem,
working memory and aggression is hypothesized to be a small effect. In order to maximize
power to detect this effect, data from Experiment 1 will be pooled with data from Experiment 2
in order to examine this effect. Results are presented with Experiment 2.
Discussion – Experiment 1
Feedback type had an effect on the physiological stress response of participants, such that
individuals who received failure feedback showed an increase in cortisol levels and a trend
toward an increase in mean arterial pressure. Of particular interest, individuals who had higher
explicit self-esteem showed greater cortisol reactivity regardless of feedback condition. The
relationship between self-esteem and reactivity has been found in numerous studies, although the
relationship has been inconsistent (Preussner, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 1999; Scarpa &
Luscher, 2002). The present study adds to the literature by integrating a measure of implicit selfesteem to examine contributions of a heterogeneous model of self-esteem to understanding
physiological reactions to feedback. The present study also is the first to examine the
consequences of these changes in physiology and appraisals on aggressive behavior.
The finding that individuals with high explicit self-esteem are more physiological
reactive to feedback, regardless of whether it is positive or negative, is puzzling. Modern theories
of ego-threat and self-esteem would predict that high self-esteem would be associated with
greater physiological reactivity in response to negative feedback (an ego-threat), but that this
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reactivity is also present when given positive feedback is particularly perplexing. It could be that
individuals with high self-esteem are just more sensitive to feedback, or possibly more open to
the opinions of others, however these hypotheses would need to be addressed in future studies.
A significant finding in the present study is the interaction between mean arterial
pressure, cortisol reactivity and aggression, such that individuals who received negative feedback
and had high MAP reactivity, but low cortisol reactivity, were more aggressive toward the
experimenter. Contrary to the hypothesis that individuals who exhibited a threat response would
become aggressive, this data suggests that the challenge response (i.e., increased blood pressure
without concurrent increase in cortisol levels) predicts aggressive behavior. Consistent with the
psychological basis of this response, individuals who exhibited this response reported a
nonsignificant trend toward feeling more challenged at the end of the experiment relative to
baseline.
Low cortisol levels have been shown to be associated with aggressive individuals in
clinical populations (Coccaro & Silver, 1995; McBurnett, Lahey, Rathouz, & Loeber, 2000). A
possible conclusion from this finding is that HPA activation to failure feedback is actually a
beneficial response. There is evidence in the clinical literature that possessing a hypoactive
cortisol response to environmental stressors is associated with an increased fear of negative
social evaluation (Tops, Riese, Oldehinkel, Rijsdijk, & Ormel, 2008), so it is possible that
individuals with this blunted response (but with appropriate activation of the cardiovascular
physiology) were more sensitive to the negative feedback and therefore more reactive to the
experimenter on the evaluation form. Of course, further study to examine this hypothesis would
be required. Should someone pursue this line of inquiry, they could measure cardiovascular and
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cortisol reactivity and see if the physiological measures mediate the relationship between
negative feedback and behavioral responses, or negative feelings.
There was no interaction between implicit and explicit self-esteem in predicting threat
responding to failure feedback, which fails to replicate an earlier study (Seery, Blascovich,
Weisbuch, & Vick, 2004). The difference in study outcomes could be due to several factors. In
their study, Seery et al. did not measure implicit self-esteem – instead they used a measure of
self-esteem stability by measuring participants’ explicit self-esteem levels at various timepoints.
The relationships between self-esteem stability and implicit self-esteem have not been examined,
but this potentially provides evidence that stability and implicit attitudes are separate constructs
(although an explicit test of this hypothesis would be required to confirm this, perhaps through
the use of structural equation modeling to see if implicit and stability measures load on separate
factors). A second difference is how the studies measured threat/challenge appraisals.
Blascovich and colleagues (as well as other labs) have traditionally taken change in impedance
cardiography (specifically total peripheral resistance) to serve as markers of the activation of the
threat, and supposedly by definition, the HPA axis. In contrast, the present study measured HPA
activation through endocrinology. This approach was chosen due to lack of access to impedance
cardiography equipment, and because salivary cortisol should provide another measure of HPA
activity. However, a literature search failed to find any studies that have concurrently measured
cortisol activity to determine the amount of covariance between the measures. Future research
should investigate the covariance of salivary cortisol levels and impedance cardiography
measures to ensure they are measuring the same construct.
A second null finding was the relationship between cortisol and working memory.
Previous studies in nonhuman animals have found a relationship between stress and working
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memory (Arnsten & Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Diamond, Park, Heman, & Rose, 1999) and recently
a relationship between cortisol and working memory has been found in human studies (Evans &
Schamberg, 2009; Luethi, Meier, & Sandi, 2009). However, these human studies have some
critical differences with each other and the present study. Evans and colleagues used a
longitudinal design to study the relationship between chronic stress and adult working memory,
finding that individuals from lower socioeconomic status experience greater chronic stress,
which results in lower working memory as young adults. Luethi and colleagues experimentally
manipulated acute stress using the Trier Social Stress Task (TSST) and found that individuals
who were in the stress group had lower scores on a measure of working memory – the reading
span task. Results were analyzed with a between-groups design, and the dose-response
relationship between cortisol and working memory was not examined. These studies suggest a
potential relationship between cortisol and working memory, but a causal relationship remains
elusive.
Unfortunately, implicit self-esteem did not account for a significant portion of the
variance, nor did it interact with any of the other independent variables when predicting
physiological reactivity to feedback or working memory changes. This seems to argue against a
role of heterogeneous self-esteem, at least in the current context of physiology and cognition,
although prior studies have found a moderating influence of implicit self-esteem in buffering
against criticism (Bosson, Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003). However, these previous
studies looked at self-enhancement tendencies and found that individuals with low implicit selfesteem (as measured by a letter-preference task) were more likely to engage in self-enhancement
activities and have more unrealistic optimism. This may hint at a role of implicit self-esteem
being more focused on guiding behavioral outcomes and less on cognitive resources.
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An additional weakness in the present study is that physiological markers of appraisals
failed to predict self-reported feelings. Although nonsignificant, there was a trend between the
interaction of MAP and cortisol reactivity predicting challenge appraisals and this lack of
significance could be due to a power issue (due to the loss of cortisol data, the sample size in the
negative feedback condition was reduced to 43 individuals, and the power to detect an effect size
of R2 = .03 is only .12 – far short of the desired .80). However, the relationship between
physiology and threat appraisals was much smaller (R2 = .01) and nonsignificant. This lack of
relationship is possibly due to the several factors. First, items chosen from the PANAS to reflect
threat may not have adequately captured the construct for which they were chosen to measure.
However, this seems unlikely as items were specifically chosen that were felt to reflect the
constructs of interest. A more likely explanation for the null effects between physiology and
self-report is that the self-report questionnaire may have been inadequate in assessing appraisals.
Technically, an appraisal is a feeling about an object or situation (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
The questionnaire that was utilized to assess emotion asked the participant to report how they
were feeling at that particular moment. A more appropriate questionnaire would have asked how
they felt retrospectively about the tasks while they were performing them, or how they were
feeling about their performance on the tasks. By directing their attention to appraising the
particular encounter which they had just performed, the questionnaire may have been a better
measure of appraisals and may have been significantly related to the physiological variables.
Furthermore, threat and challenge appraisals are, by definition, anticipatory experiences (Lazarus
& Folkman, 1984) that engender emotional responses. In the present study, the questionnaires
that asked the participant to self-report on their feelings were administered at the conclusion of
the experiment, thereby missing the anticipatory period during which the threat/challenge
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appraisals would have been present. A simple way to prevent this mistake in future studies
would be to administer the self-report questionnaire immediately before the behavioral task,
rather than at the conclusion of the task.
In summary, the first experiment suggests the importance of considering physiological
markers of appraisal when attempting to predict aggressive behavior in response to failure
feedback. Although no relationship between feedback and working memory was present,
another cognitive component that is frequently cited in studies of aggression is impulsivity and
behavioral inhibition. The first experiment also did not support a model of heterogeneous selfesteem, and the inclusion of implicit self-esteem did not contribute a significant portion of
variance to the model. In order to examine the relationships between feedback, self-esteem and
behavioral inhibition, a second experiment was conducted.
Experiment 2
Although there is a significant body of literature suggesting a relationship between
executive functioning deficits and aggression, these studies often rely on psychopathic patient
groups or alcohol intoxication rather than healthy controls. Furthermore, the relationship
between self-esteem and aggression has been intensely studied, but a thorough literature review
did not identify any studies to date that have examined the effect that implicit self-esteem may
have on the relationship between explicit self-esteem and aggression. In an attempt to clarify the
relationships between self-esteem, ego threat, inhibition and aggression, a second experiment
was performed. It was predicted that individuals with discrepant self-esteem will show a lower
ability to inhibit behavioral responses following an insult, and this lowered ability to inhibit
behavior will be associated with an increase in aggression (Figure 4).
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Participants
Examination of previous literature determined that the smallest effect size in the model
was the relationship between feedback and aggression (Konrath, Bushman, & Campbell, 2006;
Cohen’s d = .48, a medium effect). A power analysis determined that 168 participants would be
required to detect the effect (Soper, 2009). One-hundred ninety three participants (33 men) were
recruited from the introductory Psychology research pool at Georgia State University (ages 1845, mean age = 20.2 years old). Eleven participants in the negative feedback condition were
excluded for reporting they did not believe the experimenter feedback. This resulted in a sample
of 182 participants (32 men), of whom 54 were Caucasian, 80 were African-American and 47
reported other ethnicities.
Procedure
Upon arriving to the experiment, participants were asked to complete self-report
questionnaires identical to Experiment 1. The participant then completed the IAT, which was
followed with positive or negative feedback identical to experiment 1. Following feedback,
participants completed a Go/No-go task. Finally, participants were asked to complete an
evaluation of the experimenter. Following the evaluation of the experimenter, participants were
debriefed as in Experiment 1, such that any suspicion of the purpose of the experiment or the
validity of the feedback excluded the data from inclusion in the analyses.
Materials
Self-report measures and the “flexible thinking task” (IAT) will be identical to
Experiment 1. Following feedback, participants will complete the Go/No-go task.
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Response Inhibition. This task is a computer-administered task that presents participants
with a series of letters of the alphabet, based on previous versions in other studies (Amodio,
Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhof,
2003). The participant is instructed to press the space bar whenever they see a letter, except
when they see the letter X (in which case they do not press any key). Letters are presented
individually for 500 msec with a 1500 msec intertrial interval. Stimuli are separated into four
blocks, containing 60 stimuli each. The first and third blocks contain the “GO” signal (i.e., X)
80% of the time, thereby training the participant to associate X with the GO signal. The second
and fourth blocks contain the GO signal only 50% of the time – the other 50% are filled with
filler letters (NO GO). There is no break between blocks. Differences in probability of target
stimuli present changes in predictability of the stimuli for the participant. Inhibitory ability is
operationalized as the number of correct rejections of the target stimulus (i.e., not pressing the
space bar when an X is shown), after controlling for performance during the 80% training block.
Unfortunately, although Go/No-go tasks are widely used in neuropsychology, they are poorly
standardized across experiments and reliability data are seldom reported. However, in one study
that did test reliability of a Go/No-go task, the measure did show a high level of test-retest
reliability (r = .83) across a two-week span (Langenecker, Zubieta, Young, Akil, & Nielson,
2006). The task used in the present study was somewhat different from the task used in the testretest reliability study, such that the current task manipulated the probability of the Go signal as a
means to test behavioral inhibition. In the test-retest study cited above, a “Parametric Go/No-go”
(PGNG) task was used. The PGNG task integrates a working memory component, asking the
participant to only respond to the Go signal when it was preceded by a separate Go-signal (i.e.,
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the Go signals are x and y, and the participant should only respond to y when it was preceded by
x and vice versa).
Results
Data cleaning. All variables were checked for normality prior to completing analyses.
Explicit self-esteem was negatively skewed (M = 32.67, SD = 4.88) and was transformed using a
square root transformation. Implicit self-esteem data were normally distributed (M = .08, SD =
.06). Go/No-go data were positively skewed and transformed using a Log10 transformation (50%
condition M = 3.24, SD = 3.30; 80% condition M = 3.99, SD = 3.14). The transformations had
the effect of rendering the data closer to the normal distribution, although skew was still present.
Given the size of the sample, linear regression methods were assumed to still be appropriate
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
Manipulation check. In order to confirm that the experimental manipulation of negative
vs. positive feedback had the desired effect on experimenter ratings, a Mann-Whitney U test was
conducted to compare the ratings across groups. Individuals who received failure feedback rated
the experimenter lower (M = 34.31, n = 87) than individuals who received positive feedback (M
= 35.45, n = 95), U = 3467, z = -2.35, p < .05, r2 = .03 (3% of the variance, a small effect).
Hypothesis 4: Following negative feedback, discrepancies in self-esteem will be
associated with increased errors on a behavioral inhibition task.
Implicit and explicit self-esteem predicting behavioral inhibition. To examine the
relationship between implicit and explicit self-esteem in predicting behavioral inhibition after
different types of feedback, feedback was recoded into a contrast coded variable and all variables
were entered in a hierarchical regression with the 50% Go/No-go performance variable as the
criterion (Table 7). In step one, performance during 80% training, explicit self-esteem, implicit

69
self-esteem and feedback were entered, Fchange (4, 174) = 26.90, p < .001, R2change = .38. In the
second step, the two-way interaction variables were entered (Fchange (3, 171) = 2.92, p < .05,
R2change = .03). The two-way interaction term that accounted for the significant portion of
variance was the interaction between feedback and implicit self-esteem, b = .70, t = 2.95, p < .01,
pr2 = .03 (a small effect). In order to examine this relationship, 50% performance Go/No-go
scores were regressed on feedback, implicit self-esteem and their interaction. The interaction
term accounted for a significant portion (3%) of variance in behavioral inhibition, Fchange (1, 177)
= 8.72, p < .01, R2change = .03 (a small effect). The dataset was split by feedback condition such
that relationships between implicit self-esteem and 50% Go/No-go performance were examined
separately for individuals who received positive feedback versus negative feedback. These
analyses revealed inverse correlations between implicit self-esteem and feedback, depending on
the type of feedback. Individuals who received negative feedback made fewer errors on the 50%
Go/No-go task as implicit self-esteem increased, b = -.72, t (84) = -2.22, p < .05, pr2 = .04 (a
medium effect). The relationship between positive feedback and implicit self-esteem was
nonsignificant, but those participants who received positive feedback, tended to make more
errors on the Go/No-go task as implicit self-esteem increased, b = .55, t (92) = 1.82, p = .07, pr2
= .02 (a small effect).
Finally, the three-way interaction term was entered into the regression and was
nonsignificant, Fchange (1, 170) = .71, p = .40, R2change = .00.
Hypothesis 5: Following negative feedback, aggression toward the experimenter will be
predicted by increases in error rates on a behavioral inhibition task.
Behavioral inhibition and feedback predicting ratings of the experimenter. Similar to
above, ratings of the experimenter were recoded into a dichotomous variable and were regressed
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on feedback and 50% Go/No-go scores while controlling for 80% Go/No-go performance (Table
8). The full model containing all predictors was not statistically significant, χ2 (8, N = 182) =
6.97, p = .08, indicating that the model was unable to distinguish between participants who
penalized the experimenter from those who did not. The model as a whole explained between
4.4% (Cox and Snell R2) and 6.3% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in experimenter ratings and
correctly classified 71.4% of the cases. As shown in Table 8, no individual variable accounted
for a significant portion of variance in the ratings of the experimenter.
Hypothesis 6: Individuals with discrepant self-esteem will be more likely than
individuals with secure self-esteem to aggress toward the experimenter following negative
feedback.
Implicit and explicit self-esteem predicting aggression. The relationship between selfesteem is hypothesized to be a small effect size. In order to maximize power to detect this effect,
data from experiments 1 and 2 were combined. In order to account for any potential variance
caused by different experimental procedures, an experiment variable was created through
contrast coding and entered as a covariate (it did not account for any significant portion of the
variance in any of the below regressions).
To examine the relationship between the two types of self-esteem and feedback in
predicting aggression toward the experimenter, a logistic regression was utilized (Table 9)2.
Binary logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of explicit self-esteem, implicit
self-esteem and feedback on the likelihood that participants would give the experimenter a lessthan-perfect rating. The model contained the three variables, their two-way interactions, and the
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An alternative model was examined using only implicit self-esteem (without explicit selfesteem). Results are discussed in Appendix 3.
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three-way interaction. The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant, χ2 (7,
N = 299) = 15.69, p < .05, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between participants
who penalized the experimenter from those who did not. The model as a whole explained
between 5.2% (Cox and Snell R2) and 7.4% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in experimenter
ratings and correctly classified 71.4% of the cases. As shown in Table 9, two variables made a
unique significant contribution to the model: feedback condition and implicit self-esteem. The
strongest predictor of aggression was feedback type, recording an odds ratio of 2.25, such that
individuals in the negative feedback condition were 2.25 times more likely to penalize the
experimenter. The implicit self-esteem variable was less than 1, indicating that if an individual’s
implicit self-esteem increased by 1, they were .8% less likely to penalize the experimenter. (Two
notes are relevant here: First, the implicit self-esteem variable is a logarithm of a difference
score, so an increase of 1 is unrealistic. Second, this did not interact with feedback – this effect
is regardless of condition.)3.
Hypothesis 7: Performance on the behavioral inhibition task will mediate the relationship
between discrepant self-esteem and aggression.
The relationships between discrepant self-esteem and inhibition, as well as the
relationship between behavioral inhibition and aggression were nonsignificant. Therefore, the
data did not meet the assumptions for mediation and this hypothesis was not tested.

3

A consistent finding in the aggression literature is a difference between the sexes on measures
of aggression. A separate hierarchical regression was conducted to examine if sex of the
participant had any effect on the relationships and it did not (four way interaction: Fchange (1,
277) = 2.44, p = .12, R2change = .01). However, this could be due to the small percentage (6%) of
men in the sample.
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Discussion – Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examined the relationships between self-esteem and behavioral inhibition
when presented with success or failure feedback. It was hypothesized that implicit and explicit
self-esteem would interact to predict a loss of inhibition when presented with failure feedback,
but this hypothesis was not supported. However, there was an interaction between implicit selfesteem and feedback, such that higher implicit self-esteem was associated with fewer behavioral
inhibition errors following negative feedback. This finding is consistent with the idea of selfesteem as a buffer to criticism.
Unfortunately, there was no relationship between measures of behavioral inhibition and
aggression in the present study. This finding is most likely not due to failure in the
manipulation, as individuals who received negative feedback did show a trend toward rating the
experimenter lower on the feedback form. The lack of relationship is more likely due to the type
of measure used to quantify aggression. A questionnaire rating the experimenter (which is
supposedly going to the supervisor) is a rather indirect and instrumental form of aggression, and
instrumental aggression is not necessarily correlated with inhibition (unlike hostile aggression;
Ramirez & Andreu, 2006). In future studies, laboratory tasks employing more direct forms of
aggression (such as the Taylor Aggression Paradigm) may be able to overcome this limitation, or
be better able to capture the relationship between these concepts.
There also was no relationship between implicit self-esteem, explicit self-esteem and
aggression following failure feedback. Previous studies have shown that individuals with
insecure self-esteem are more likely to use hostile interpersonal strategies as a method of selfregulation, to protect against ego-threat (Jordan, et al., 2003; Zeigler-Hill, 2006) and children
with discrepant self-esteem are more aggressive than their secure self-esteem peers (Sandstrom

73
& Jordan, 2008) when aggression is measured by both physical and relational standards.
Therefore, the absence of a relationship between the measures in the present study is challenging.
One issue that arose in the collection of data was a restriction of range in the scores on the
measure of aggression. The majority of participants (70%) did not rate the experimenter lower
than the maximum points allowed (i.e., 70% of participants rated the participants as extremely
competent, friendly, and suggested they be hired). In an attempt to work past this constraint,
values were dichotomized and a logistic regression strategy was used to analyze the data. Future
research should utilize measures of aggression that have a greater amount of variance before we
can accept a true null relationship between these variables.
Experiment 3
Instructions that emphasize threat or challenge have been shown to affect physiological
responses, but their effects on mental processes remain unclear. The third experiment
manipulated threat and challenge using instructions similar to previous experiments (Blascovich
& Tomaka, 1996) and then measured performance on working memory and inhibition tasks. It
was predicted that individuals who receive instructions that emphasize threat would show lower
working memory ability than individuals who receive instructions that emphasize challenge. It
was also hypothesized that threat-related instructions would also be associated with a decreased
ability to inhibit behavior, and this relationship would be mediated by the decrease in working
memory ability (Figure 5).
Participants
A review of previous literature determined that the smallest effect size in the model was
the relationship between working memory and behavioral inhibition (Mitchell, Macrae, &

74
Gilchrist, 2002; Cohen’s d = .52, a medium effect size). A power analysis determined that 144
participants would be required to detect this effect (Soper, 2009). A total of 186 participants (58
men, 67 White, 64 African-American, 55 other ethnicity) were recruited online from the
introductory Psychology research pool (ages 18-42, mean age 20.4 years old). Two participants
were dropped for failing to pay attention to any of the tasks, three participants were dropped
from the baseline operation span data for failing to follow instructions, and six participants did
not have behavioral inhibition data collected due to equipment failure. This resulted in a final
sample size of 175 participants with complete data.
Procedure
Upon arriving to the lab, participants were asked to complete self-report measures
identical to Experiment 1. Participants were then given instructions on how to perform the
operation span task (see Experiment 1). In addition to the instructions, a threat/challenge
manipulation was added to the end of the instructions: one set of instructions presented the task
as a challenge (“Think of the task as a challenge...think of yourself as someone who can meet
this challenge”) and another emphasized threat (“It is important to be as quick and as accurate as
possible...your score will depend on it”). To reinforce this manipulation, a 3x5 note card was
placed to the left of the computer screen with a challenge (“I can meet this challenge”) or threat
(“Do well. Your score depends on it.”) message. Following the operation span task, participants
completed the Go/No-go task (identical to experiment 2), followed by the automated operation
span task (identical to experiment 1).
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Results
Data Screening. All variables were examined for normality. Automated operation span
scores were negatively skewed (M = 54.70, SD = 12.96) which was corrected by reflecting and
then log10 transformed. Four cases were identified as outliers (> 3 SD from the mean of the
distribution) and were Winsorized to one unit greater than the largest value such that they
retained their position in the distribution without exerting as substantial influence. As would be
expected, Go/No-go data were positively skewed (50% condition M = 2.86, SD = 2.66; 80%
condition M = 3.31, SD = 3.07). These data were log-transformed and seven values were
Winsorized to a value of .29 (one unit less than the lowest value of .30). Baseline working
memory scores were normally distributed (M = .73, SD = .10).
Manipulation Check. In order to assess the efficacy of the threat/challenge manipulation,
self-reported emotion on the PANAS questionnaire was examined for before and after the
manipulation using hierarchical regression. PANAS items reflecting threat were selected to
index measures of threat (see Appendix B; α = .90), as were items to reflect challenge (α = .86).
A mixed between-within subjects ANOVA was conducted to assess the impact of
threat/challenge instructions on participants’ self-reported emotion comparing between baseline
(pre-manipulation) and at the end of the experiment (Figure 6). There was not a significant
difference in threat appraisals across conditions, Wilks Lambda = .99, F (1, 179) = 2.01, p = .16,
pη2 = .01 (a small effect), nor was there a significant difference in challenge appraisals across
conditions, Wilks Lambda = .99, F (1, 177) = 1.45, p = .23, pη2 = .01 (a small effect). However,
individuals overall felt more threatened at the end of the task relative to the beginning, regardless
of condition, Wilks Lambda = .98, F (1, 178) = 4.65, p = .03, pη2 = .03 (a small effect). There
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was no main effect for challenge across time, Wilks Lambda = 1.00, F (1, 178) = .83, p = .36,
pη2 = .01 (a small effect).
Although the intended task manipulation did not have the desired effect, there was a
significant main effect on feelings of threat regardless of task condition, Wilks Lambda = .98, F
(1, 178) = 4.65, p = .03, pη2 = .03 (a small effect). For this reason, an additional analysis
examining the relationship between feelings of threat and dependent variables of interest was
conducted, although causality cannot be inferred as threat was not experimentally manipulated.
Hypothesis 8: Threat appraisals will be associated with a decrease in working memory
capacity, whereas challenge appraisals will be associated with an increase in working memory
capacity.
Relationship of threat/challenge instructions to working memory. Threat/Challenge
conditions were coded into a contrast variable such that the variable could be analyzed using
regression methods. Hierarchical regression was used to examine the effect of threat/challenge
on working memory (Table 10a). In the first step, baseline working memory was entered into
the regression to act as a covariate, Fchange (1, 174) = 16.51, p < .001, R2change = .08 (a medium
effect). In the second step, threat/challenge condition was entered as a predictor of the
automated working memory total score Fchange (1, 173) = .37, p = .54, R2change = .002 (a small
effect).
Relationship between feelings of threat and working memory. Because the manipulation
of threat/challenge instructions were not sufficient to differentiate feelings of threat between the
groups, a hierarchical regression was conducted to explore for potential relationships between
feelings of threat engendered by the experiment and changes in working memory capacity. In
the first step, baseline operation span score, experiment manipulation condition and baseline self-
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reported threat emotion were entered to serve as covariates. After controlling for these variables,
the post-manipulation working memory score was regressed on the post-manipulation feelings of
threat. There was a relationship between threat and working memory with increased feelings of
threat being associated with a higher working memory scores, b = .14, t = 2.73, p < .01, r2 = .04
(a medium effect).
Relationship between feelings of challenge and working memory. Because the
manipulation of threat/challenge instructions were not sufficient to differentiate feelings of threat
between the groups, a hierarchical regression was conducted to explore for potential
relationships between feelings of challenge engendered by the experiment and changes in
working memory capacity. In the first step, baseline operation span score, experiment
manipulation condition and baseline self-reported challenge emotion were entered to serve as
covariates. After controlling for these variables, the post-manipulation working memory score
was regressed on the post-manipulation feelings of challenge. There was a relationship between
challenge and working memory with increased feelings of challenge being associated with lower
working memory scores, b = -.10, t = -2.79, p < .01, r2 = .04 (a medium effect).
Hypothesis 9: Threat appraisals will be associated with greater error rates on the
behavioral inhibition task, whereas challenge appraisals will be associated with lower error rates.
Relationship of threat/challenge instructions to behavioral inhibition. Again,
hierarchical regression was used to examine how threat/challenge instructions affect behavioral
inhibition as measured by the Go/No-go task (Table 10b). Condition failed to predict behavioral
inhibition errors, Fchange (1, 175) = .24, p = .62, R2change = .00.
Relationship between feelings of threat and behavioral inhibition. In order to examine the
relationship between feelings of threat and behavioral inhibition, Go/No-go scores were

78
regressed on feelings of threat. In the first step, baseline experiment manipulation condition,
baseline self-reported threat emotion, and performance during 80% training were entered to
serve as covariates. After controlling for these variables, the post-manipulation Go/No-go score
was regressed on the post-manipulation feelings of threat. There was no relationship between
feelings of threat and behavioral inhibition, b = -.01, t = -.69, p = .49, r2 = .00.
Relationship between feelings of challenge and behavioral inhibition. In order to examine
the relationship between feelings of challenge and behavioral inhibition, Go/No-go scores were
regressed on feelings of challenge. In the first step, baseline experiment manipulation condition,
baseline self-reported challenge emotion, and performance during 80% training were entered to
serve as covariates. After controlling for these variables, the post-manipulation Go/No-go score
was regressed on the post-manipulation feelings of challenge. There was no relationship
between feelings of threat and behavioral inhibition, b = -.01, t = -1.23, p = .22, r2 = .01.
Hypothesis 10: Working memory will mediate the relationship between threat/challenge
appraisals and behavioral inhibition.
Relationship between working memory and behavioral inhibition. In order to examine
the relationship between working memory and behavioral inhibition, hierarchical regression was
used (Table 11). Threat/challenge condition assignment and performance in the 80% condition
were entered in the first step, Fchange (2, 170) = 39.76, p < .01, R2change = .32 (a large effect).
Post-manipulation working memory score was then entered in a subsequent step and it did not
account for a significant portion of variance in behavioral inhibition scores, Fchange (1, 169) = .08,
p = .77, R2change = .00. Because working memory did not account for a significant portion of
variance in behavioral inhibition, the conditions were not met to test for mediation and therefore
it was not tested.

79
Discussion – Experiment 3
Experiment 3 examined the consequences of threat/challenge appraisals on behavioral
inhibition abilities and working memory. The experimental manipulation was insufficient to
statistically differentiate threat and challenge in each experimental group; however, there was a
significant increase in feelings of threat throughout the experiment. Therefore, in addition to the
proposed analyses examining differences between groups, an additional analysis examined
correlations between feelings of threat and dependent variables of interest.
With regard to working memory, the experimental manipulation had no effect on
participants’ working memory abilities. However, when working memory scores were regressed
on feelings of threat (controlling for experimental manipulation), higher feelings of threat were
associated with increased working memory scores. Although this is counter to the direction
which was hypothesized, the most parsimonious explanation is likely that participants who felt
more threatened were exerting greater effort than participants who were not experiencing a
feeling of threat. Challenge, however, was associated with a decreased working memory
capacity. This is opposite of what was hypothesized: that threat (via activation of the HPA axis
and release of cortisol) would impair working memory performance. Challenge appraisals, as
noted above, are thought to be marked by activation of the SAM axis, and its release of
norepinephrine (NE). Although NE facilitates working memory at low doses, higher doses of
NE impair the function of the prefrontal cortex and working memory performance (Arnsten &
Robbins, 2002). Pharmacological administration of NE agonists, such as Clonidine, impair
working memory, but other studies using more specific NE agonists have had mixed results (for
review, see Chamberlain, Muller, Blackwell, Robbins & Sahakian, 2006). The results in the
present study, suggesting that increased appraisals of challenge, and possibly greater SAM axis
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activation, are associated with decrements in working memory performance may fit with this
literature. Future studies utilizing psychophysiological measurements, such as MAP and salivary
cortisol, may be able to better understand the relationships between SAM vs. HPA activation and
working memory performance.
Unlike working memory, there was no relationship between threat and behavioral
inhibition performance: neither when comparing groups across the experimental manipulation,
nor when regressing performance on self-reported changes in feelings of threat. There are
several potential explanations for the failure to find this relationship. First, the method of
assessing behavioral inhibition ability may not have been sensitive enough to detect impairments
in inhibitory ability. The task used in the current study was selected from psychophysiology
experiments that manipulated the probability of the Go and No-go signals. However, many
cognitive experiments now utilize more sensitive measures of behavioral inhibition, such as Stop
Signal Reaction Time tasks (SSRT). In these tasks, participants are instructed to respond to a Go
signal, except when it is immediately followed by a second stimulus that occurs at a variable
time point after the Go signal. Therefore, the behavioral measure is the ability to stop the
prepotent response that has already been initiated by the Go signal (Band & Boxtel, 1999).
A second reason the behavioral inhibition measure may have been unrelated to the
threat/challenge manipulation is because the manipulation was not sufficient to differentiate
between appraisals of threat and challenge in self-reported feelings. During debriefing, in
talking to participants, many reported feeling anxiety regarding the instructions of the automated
working memory task, especially with the instructions that they had to keep their performance
above 85% accuracy. If future studies wish to examine the relationship between
threat/challenge and behavioral inhibition ability, the simplest way to overcome this problem
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would be to manipulate threat and challenge and not include an intervening task that may alter
appraisals of the situation.
In summary, the third experiment adds to the literature by investigating how
threat/challenge appraisals can influence working memory. Counter to the hypothesis that threat
would be associated with impairment of working memory, increases in challenge appraisals were
associated with decreases in working memory capacity. However, these results are merely
correlational and the manipulation of threat/challenge was insufficient to differentiate between
groups. Future studies should consider utilizing different tasks of working memory (such as
Trails B) that do not involve a math component as many participants reported anxiety as a result
of this component. Furthermore, future studies that investigate the relationship between
threat/challenge and behavioral inhibition should utilize a more sensitive task (such as the SSRT)
and only include the threat/challenge manipulation directly before measuring inhibitory ability.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Each Experiment
n

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Explicit Self-Esteem

115

32.57

33.00

5.11

Implicit Self-Esteem

114

.07

.07

.06

Baseline Mean Arterial
Pressure
Baseline Cortisol

115

83.24

83.00

9.17

108

7.88

7.04

3.75

Baseline Working
Memory
Automated Working
Memory
Experiment 2

113

.74

.74

.09

113

49.00

52.00

15.53

Explicit Self-Esteem

179

32.67

33.00

4.88

Implicit Self-Esteem

182

.08

.07

.06

50% Go/No-go

182

3.24

3.00

3.30

80% Go/No-go

182

3.99

4.00

3.14

Evaluation Questionnaire

298

34.91

36.00

2.84

Baseline Working
Memory
Automated Working
Memory
50% Go/No-go

181

.73

.74

.10

179

54.70

57.00

12.96

178

2.86

2.00

2.66

80% Go/No-go

178

3.31

2.00

3.07

Experiment 1

Experiment 3
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Table 2
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis Testing the Relationship Between SelfEsteem and Cortisol Reactivity
Variable

b

SE

ß

t

Feedback Type

-.70

.31

-.17

-2.27*

Explicit Self-Esteem

.64

.36

.14

1.80

Implicit Self-Esteem

.93

5.07

.01

.18

Feedback Type

-.73

1.03

-.18

-.71

Explicit Self-Esteem

.63

.37

.14

1.74

Implicit Self-Esteem

.52

18.71

.01

.03

Feedback x Explicit SE

-.01

.37

-.01

-.03

Feedback x Implicit SE

-.55

5.32

-.01

-.10

Explicit x Implicit SE

-.20

6.63

-.01

-.03

Feedback Type

-.75

1.04

-.18

-.71

Explicit Self-Esteem

.63

.37

.13

1.68

Implicit Self-Esteem

.00

19.09

.00

.00

Feedback x Explicit SE

-.01

.37

-.01

-.04

Feedback x Implicit SE

2.41

19.16

.04

.13

Explicit x Implicit SE

-.39

6.78

-.02

-.05

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3
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Feedback x Implicit x

1.09

6.79

.05

.16

Explicit SE
Note. SE = Self-Esteem; Baseline cortisol values were entered as covariates in every step;
*

p < .05.
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Table 3
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis Testing the Relationship Between SelfEsteem and Mean Arterial Pressure Reactivity
Variable

b

SE

ß

t

Feedback Type

-.90

.50

-.09

-1.79

Explicit Self-Esteem

.73

.58

.07

1.27

Implicit Self-Esteem

-8.40

8.45

-.05

-.99

Feedback Type

-.91

1.69

-.09

-.54

Explicit Self-Esteem

.83

.59

.07

1.40

Implicit Self-Esteem

-38.07

31.41

-.23

1.21

Feedback x Explicit SE

.01

.59

.00

.01

Feedback x Implicit SE

2.71

8.63

.02

.31

-10.64

11.00

-.19

-.97

Feedback Type

-.93

1.71

-.09

-.54

Explicit Self-Esteem

.82

.60

.07

1.37

Implicit Self-Esteem

-38.30

31.86

-.234

1.20

Feedback x Explicit SE

.00

.60

.00

.00

Feedback x Implicit SE

4.34

32.00

.03

.14

-10.72

11.16

-.19

-.96

Step 1

Step 2

Explicit x Implicit SE
Step 3

Explicit x Implicit SE
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Feedback x Implicit x

.59

11.18

.01

.05

Explicit SE
Note. SE = Self-Esteem; Baseline mean arterial pressure (MAP) values were entered as
covariates in every step; * p < .05.
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Table 4
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis Testing the Relationship Between
Physiological Reactivity and Working Memory
Variable

b

SE

ß

t

Feedback Type

.14

.13

.10

1.11

MAP

.03

.02

.20

1.21

Cortisol

-.02

.04

-.05

-.35

Feedback Type

.14

.13

.10

1.09

MAP

.03

.02

.20

1.13

Cortisol

-.01

.05

-.04

-.27

Feedback x MAP

.00

.01

.00

.03

Feedback x Cortisol

.01

.03

.03

.26

MAP x Cortisol

.00

.00

.00

-.03

Feedback Type

.16

.13

.12

1.23

MAP

.02

.03

.16

.88

Cortisol

-.02

.05

-.05

-.37

Feedback x MAP

.00

.01

.03

.29

Feedback x Cortisol

.02

.04

.06

.57

MAP x Cortisol

.00

.00

-.02

-.17

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

88
Feedback x MAP x

.00

.00

-.11

-.88

Cortisol
Note. Baseline cortisol and mean arterial pressure (MAP) values were entered as covariates in
each step; ** p < .01; * p < .05.
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Table 5
Logistic Regression – Physiology and Feedback Predicting Aggression
Note: MAP = Mean arterial pressure.
Variable

B

SE

Wald

df

p

Odds

95.0% C.I.

Ratio

Lower

Upper

.15

.09

2.52

1

.11

1.16

.97

1.38

Baseline MAP

-.01

.05

.02

1

.89

.99

.89

1.10

Post Cortisol

-.12

.11

1.03

1

.31

.89

.71

1.11

Post MAP

.06

.06

1.21

1

.27

1.06

.95

1.19

Feedback

1.22

.56

4.79

1

.03

3.40

1.14

10.16

Feedback x

-.10

.09

1.22

1

.27

.90

.75

1.08

-.09

.04

5.64

1

.02

.92

.85

.99

-.03

.01

4.05

1

.04

.98

.95

.99

.03

.01

3.80

1

.05

1.03

1.00

1.05

-1.77

.43

17.25

1

.61

.09

Baseline
Cortisol

Cortisol
Feedback x
MAP
MAP x
Cortisol
Three Way
Constant
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Table 6
Logistic Regression (Negative Feedback Only) – Physiology predicting aggression
Variable

B

SE

Wald

df

p

Odds

95.0% C.I.

Ratio

Lower

Upper

Baseline Cortisol

.31

.15

4.40

1

.04

1.37

1.02

1.83

Baseline MAP

.07

.10

.421

1

.52

1.07

.88

1.30

Post Cortisol

-.22

.18

1.48

1

.22

.80

.56

1.14

Post MAP

.08

.09

.66

1

.42

1.07

.90

1.30

MAP x Cortisol

-.06

.03

5.27

1

.02

.94

.89

.99

Constant

-.64

.39

2.72

1

.10

.53

Note: MAP = Mean arterial pressure.
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Table 7
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression Analysis Testing the Relationship Between SelfEsteem and Behavioral Inhibition
Variable

b

SE

ß

t

.69

.07

.62

10.32***

Explicit Self-Esteem

.01

.01

.04

.74

Implicit Self-Esteem

-.05

.23

-.01

-.22

Feedback Type

.00

.01

-.01

-.23

.66

.07

.60

10.01**

Explicit Self-Esteem

.00

.01

.02

.31

Implicit Self-Esteem

-.04

.23

-.01

-.15

Feedback Type

.00

.01

.02

.32

Explicit x Implicit SE

-.16

.21

-.05

-.76

Feedback x Implicit

.70

.24

.18

2.94**

Feedback x Explicit

.00

.01

-.01

-.09

Step 1
80% Go/No-go
Condition

Step 2
80% Go/No-go
Condition
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Step 3
80% Go/No-go

.66

.07

.59

9.92***

Explicit Self-Esteem

.01

.01

.02

.37

Implicit Self-Esteem

-.08

.24

-.02

-.33

Feedback Type

.00

.01

.00

-.03

Explicit x Implicit SE

-.14

.21

-.04

-.65

Feedback x Implicit

.69

.24

.18

2.92**

Feedback x Explicit

.00

.01

.00

-.04

Feedback x Implicit x

.18

.21

.05

.84

Condition

Explicit SE
Note. SE = Self-esteem; * p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 8
Logistic Regression- Relationship Between Behavioral Inhibition and Aggression
Variable

B

SE

Wald

df

p

Odds

95.0% C.I.

Ratio

Lower

Upper

Feedback

-1.12

1.03

1.19

1

.27

.33

.04

2.45

80% Go/No go

-.63

1.01

.39

1

.53

.53

.07

3.83

50% Go/No go

.20

.94

.05

1

.83

1.22

.19

7.64

-1.38

.76

3.25

1

.07

.25

-.06

.80

.01

1

.94

.94

Feedback x
50% Go/No-go
Constant
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Table 9
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis Testing the Relationships Between Implicit & Explicit
Self-Esteem, Feedback and Aggression

Variable

B

SE

Wald

df

p

Odds

95.0% C.I.

Ratio

Lower

Upper

Feedback

.82

.28

8.68

1

.00

2.25

1.31

3.86

Explicit SE

-.20

.16

1.69

1

.19

.82

.60

1.10

Implicit SE

-4.77

2.36

4.08

1

.04

.01

.00

.87

Feedback x

-.80

2.36

.12

1

.74

.45

.00

46.00

.02

.16

.01

1

.91

1.02

.75

1.38

-1.83

2.60

.50

1

.48

.16

.00

26.28

Three-Way

-2.86

2.60

1.21

1

.27

.06

.00

9.41

Constant

-1.37

.21

42.12

1

.00

.25

Implicit SE
Feedback x
Explicit SE
Implicit SE x
Explicit SE

Note. SE = Self-Esteem.
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Table 10
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression Analyses Testing the Relationships Between
Threat/Challenge Manipulation and (a) Working Memory; (b) Behavioral Inhibition
Variable

b

SE

ß

t

-4.56

1.12

-.294

-4.06**

Baseline Working Memory

-4.53

1.13

-.29

-4.02**

Threat/Challenge Condition

.06

.11

.04

.60

80% Condition Performance

.53

.06

.56

8.93***

Threat/Challenge Condition

-.01

.02

-.05

-.681

a) Criterion: Working Memory
Step 1
Baseline Working Memory
Step 2

b) Criterion: Go/No Go

Note. ** p < .01., *** p < .001
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Table 11
Summary of Hierarchical Linear Regression Analyses Testing the Relationship Between
Working Memory and Behavioral Inhibition
Variable

b

SE

ß

t

Condition

-.01

.02

-.03

-.44

80% performance

.53

.06

.56

8.91***

Condition

-.01

.02

-.04

-.47

80% performance

.53

.06

.56

8.88***

Post-Manipulation

.01

.04

.02

.29

Step 1

Step 2

Working Memory
***p < .001.
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Figure 2 - Conceptual Model for Experiment 1.

Operation Span
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Figure 3 - Probabilities of Aggression Based on Physiological Responses. Individuals with
discrepant physiological responses are more likely to aggress toward the experimenter –
participants with low cortisol responses but high mean arterial pressure responses are nearly
100% likely to aggress.
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Figure 6 - Feelings of Threat at Baseline and End of Study.
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CHAPTER THREE: GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of the present study is to help understand the relationships between self-esteem
(explicit vs. implicit) and aggression by examining the physiological and cognitive consequences
of receiving failure feedback. The overarching model was that individuals with insecure selfesteem react to failure feedback with a physiological threat response, which depletes working
memory capacity, reduces behavioral inhibition abilities and thereby increases aggressive
tendencies (Figure 1). This model was tested in a series of three experiments. In experiment
one, blood pressure and cortisol levels were recorded before and after participants received
failure (or praise) feedback. Relationships between changes in physiology, working memory and
aggression were examined. Experiment two repeated the failure/praise feedback manipulation
and examined consequences for behavioral inhibition and aggression. Finally, experiment three
attempted to manipulate threat/challenge appraisals to directly examine implication for cognition
– specifically behavioral inhibition and working memory.
Unfortunately, this model was not supported by the data, and therefore may need to be
revised (Figure 7). The revised model suggests that threat/challenge responding (as marked by
physiological markers in response to negative feedback) may directly influence working memory
and aggression, but working memory and aggression may not be necessarily interrelated.
Furthermore, implicit self-esteem may buffer against negative feedback in preventing errors in
behavioral inhibition, but this is not necessarily related to an increase in aggressive tendencies.
However, as discussed above, more sensitive measures of behavioral inhibition, such as a stopsignal task, may be better suited to detect this relationship. Future studies should seek to test
individual components of this revised model to better understand how the separate constructs
may be interrelated.
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The present study is one of the first studies to utilize implicit self-esteem to examine
consequences for aggression. A large number of studies have examined the relationship between
explicit self-esteem and aggression but as self-esteem researchers have identified the existence of
implicit self-attitudes, their inclusion in studies of aggression has been absent. A second
contribution of the present study is that it is the first study to integrate threat/challenge
physiology in the prediction of aggression. By utilizing a multiple level approach, the ability to
predict behavior was increased by recording psychophysiology.
Specific Aims
Specific Aim 1: Examine how failure feedback alters physiological responding and how
these responses alter working memory capacity. In Experiment 1, the impact of failure feedback
on physiology and working memory was examined. Individuals with high explicit self-esteem
showed larger increases in cortisol, regardless of feedback, and the interaction between implicit
self-esteem and explicit self-esteem did not predict increases in mean arterial pressure nor
cortisol responses to failure feedback. Implicit self-esteem alone did not account for a
significant portion of variance in physiology, or working memory in response to failure
feedback. Cortisol increases were not associated with a decrease in working memory, as was
hypothesized, but increases in challenge appraisals were associated with decreases in working
memory capacity.
The link between discrepant self-esteem and working memory is a more distant
theoretical connection, but the lack of a relationship between rise in cortisol levels and decrease
in working memory is surprising. Recent studies have found an association between stress and
working memory in humans (Evans et al., 2009; Luethi, et al., 2009), but, as mentioned above,
there are methodological differences in those studies that could account for the differences.
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Luethi and colleagues (2009) examined differences in working memory across groups, one of
which was exposed to the Trier Social Stressor Task, and the other was not. The social stress
group performed lower on a test of working memory, but the authors did not correlate these data
with the cortisol data collected in the study thereby failing to demonstrate a dose-response
relationship between cortisol changes and working memory depletion. In order to determine
causality, such a relationship will need to be demonstrated. A recent study by Lewis, Nikolova,
Chang and Weekes (2008) found an increase in working memory (as measured by backward
digit span) when participants were undergoing examination stress, but there was no relationship
between working memory augmentation and cortisol levels.
There are a few potential explanations for the absence of this relationship in the present
data. The first is the time course of the cortisol response. Cortisol typically takes 20+ minutes to
reach peak levels in the bloodstream in humans. The time between the failure feedback and
beginning the working memory task was approximately 7 minutes (with the task taking 20
minutes), such that the cortisol level may not have had time to reach peak levels in time to
significantly impair task performance. A second potential explanation is that the failure
feedback may not have been sufficient to generate a large enough cortisol response to impair
working memory. Failure feedback tended to increase cortisol levels, but not significantly (p =
.06). Using traditional tasks such as the Trier Social Stressor Task tends to have a much stronger
effect on cortisol levels, which would help detect any relationship between cortisol and
cognition. Therefore, future studies should consider including a longer delay between failure
feedback and working memory, or use a more standardized method of experimentally
manipulating cortisol (e.g. pharmacological administration).
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Implicit self-esteem did not predict a significant portion of variance in the model, neither
when it was an independent variable nor when taken in combination with explicit self-esteem.
Specific Aim 2: Examine the impact of failure feedback on physiology, and the
consequences physiological changes have on aggression. A significant interaction was found
between cortisol and mean arterial pressure (MAP) responding, when presented with negative
feedback. This interaction predicted aggression toward the experimenter, as well as a reduction
in positive affect. Individuals with congruent physiological responses – i.e., an increase in
cortisol accompanied by an increase in MAP – were less likely to become aggressive toward the
experimenter. Individuals who reacted to negative feedback with an increase in MAP, but
without an accompanying increase in cortisol – a physiological challenge response – were more
likely to become aggressive toward the experimenter. Individuals who exhibited a physiological
threat response (i.e., an increase in cortisol without concurrent increase in blood pressure) had an
equal probability of being aggressive toward the experimenter.
The initial hypothesis was that individuals who exhibited a threat response – marked by
an increase in cortisol, with no increase in blood pressure – would be the individuals who
became aggressive in response to failure feedback. Based on previous research suggesting that
cortisol would impair working memory, it was hypothesized that a rise in cortisol would result in
greater aggressive tendencies, mediated by a decrease in working memory capacity. However,
the opposite was the case: individuals with a physiological challenge response – increased blood
pressure without an accompanying increase in cortisol – were the most aggressive individuals.
This finding fits well with the literature on cortisol and aggression (for review, see Terburg,
Morgan and van Honk, in press). The triple-balance model of emotion processing suggests that
cortisol increases communication between cortical and subcortical structures involved in
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emotional decision making, and therefore individuals with low cortisol levels should have
reduced levels of communication between these emotion regulation and action structures (van
Honk & Schutter, 2006).4 The present study did not find an effect for baseline levels of cortisol,
but cortisol change, when combined with the change in blood pressure, was a significant
predictor of aggressive behavior.
Challenge motivations are hypothesized to result from an individual’s appraisal as having
the resources to accomplish goals, and therefore is associated with approach-related affect. This
conception of aggression as an approach-motivated behavior is an interesting addition to the
literature suggesting that anger as an approach-related affect (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009).
Anger and aggression are traditionally closely related (for review, see Wilkowski & Robinson,
2008), and the inclusion of psychophysiological measures in future research could assist in
understanding this link.
Specific Aim 3: Examine the impact discrepant self-esteem has on physiology, working
memory and aggression when presented with failure feedback. One goal of the present research
was to use personality variables, specifically implicit and explicit self-esteem, to predict which
participants are more likely to have a threat vs. challenge physiological response. As discussed
above, the present study is one of the first studies to examine the relationship between selfesteem and aggression in the context of a dual-attitude model of self-esteem (implicit and
explicit). Unfortunately, no relationships were present between discrepant (high explicit, low
implicit) self-esteem and physiology or aggressive behavior. This fails to replicate an earlier

4

However, this model predicts that low cortisol levels should be associated with increased
behavioral activation tendencies, and in the present study there was no relationship between
baseline cortisol levels and behavioral activation as measured by the Behavioral
Activation/Inhibition Scale (Carver & White, 1993).
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finding by Seery et al. (2004) that found that individuals with unstable self-esteem responded to
failure feedback with a threat response. In the present study, there was no relationship between
discrepant self-esteem and any of the physiological variables. As discussed above, this failure to
replicate could be due to several factors. Most notably, Seery and colleagues used a measure of
self-esteem stability, in which participants complete an explicit self-esteem questionnaire at 12hour intervals. The relationship between self-esteem stability and implicit self-esteem is not yet
clear, but individuals with high implicit and explicit (i.e. secure) self-esteem show more stable
self-esteem than individuals with discrepant self-esteem. No research to date has examined the
stability of implicit self-esteem, or what consequences unstable implicit self-esteem may have
for the self and behavior. Future research should compare and contrast self-esteem stability and
implicit self-esteem, and examine any individual consequences they have for behavior.
Similarly, there was no relationship between discrepant self-esteem and changes in
working memory capacity following failure feedback. The hypothesis that discrepant selfesteem would result in an increased ego threat, thereby depleting working memory, was
constructed to be parallel to the literature which has found a decrease in working memory in
individuals who experience stereotype threat (e.g., Schmader et al., 2003). Stereotype threat is a
psychological state brought on by “situations that pose a significant threat to self-integrity, the
sense of oneself as a coherent and valued entity that is adaptable to the environment” (p. 3;
Schmader, Johns & Forbes, 2008). In their integrated process model of stereotype threat,
Schmader and colleagues base the existence of threat on a cognitive imbalance, which closely
parallels the imbalance between implicit and explicit self-esteem. As a result of this imbalance,
the authors propose that when presented with stereotypes that “expect” poor performance (e.g.
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the performance of women on math exams), the individual experiences a stress response, which
depletes cognitive reserve capacity, specifically working memory.
The present study attempted to replicate this finding in individuals with insecure selfesteem, and to understand a potential physiological mechanism (i.e., cortisol increase) by which
threat and stress could deplete working memory. There was no relationship between an
imbalance in self-esteem, working memory performance following failure feedback, nor between
physiological threat responses and working memory performance. Therefore, the depletion of
working memory in stereotype threat may potentially be due to other factors (for review, see
Schmader et al., 2008). These potential mechanisms are cognitive strategies that compete for
limited cognitive resources, such as increased self-monitoring, and attempting to suppress
thoughts associated with the stereotype threat. Investigating these potential mediators and
developing strategies for reducing them should be a goal of future research on the relationship
between threat, cognitive discrepancies and cognitive resources. With regard to aggression, a
potential clinical use of this study would be to investigate how helping individuals reappraise a
situation can alter their physiological responding and potentially mitigate aggressive behavior.
Working memory was not changed as a result of physiological reactivity, nor was the
change in working memory able to predict aggressive behavior. However, baseline working
memory was able to predict the likelihood that an individual would aggress following negative
behavior. This finding replicates an earlier study by Kleider, Parrott and King (in press) that
found police officers were more likely to make errors on a shooting task if they had low working
memory span scores. This conceptual replication of that previous study has found that working
memory also predicts aggression after negative feedback, and future studies should continue to
examine the relationships between working memory and aggressive behavior.
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Although no relationships were present between discrepant self-esteem and physiological
reactivity, nor between discrepant self-esteem and aggression, the current study did find some
interesting results that do lend support to the idea of self-esteem as a buffer against negative
encounters. First, implicit self-esteem served a protective role against negative criticism when
performing a behavioral inhibition task. Individuals with higher implicit self-esteem made fewer
errors on the Go/No-go task after receiving negative feedback. Second, explicit self-esteem
predicted cortisol reactivity, regardless of feedback condition. In the context of the findings that
individuals without a cortisol response were more likely to become aggressive following
negative feedback, this finding suggests that higher self-esteem may be associated with greater
cortisol reactivity, which, in turn, may protect against aggressive behavior. However, this
reactivity was occurring regardless of feedback condition which may be maladaptive.
Specific Aim 4: Examine the impact of threat/challenge manipulations on behavioral
inhibition and working memory. A final goal of the present study was to examine how
manipulating threat/challenge appraisals could affect cognitive abilities, specifically working
memory and behavioral inhibition (as measured by the Go/No-go task). Unfortunately, the
threat/challenge manipulation that was utilized was insufficient to alter participants’ appraisals of
the task – participants in the threat condition were not more threatened by the instructions than
participants in the challenge condition. Although participants were not asked explicitly during
debriefing if they felt threatened/challenged, the self-report Positive and Negative Affect Scale
(PANAS) was used to detect changes in feelings of threat/challenge over the course of the
experiment. In hindsight, part of the reason for the failure to successfully manipulate threat and
challenge was likely the nature of the the Operation Span Task. Many participants reported that
the task itself was stressful, especially the act of completing math problems in the presence of
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another person and needing to keep task performance above 85% accuracy. This obstacle could
easily be overcome in future studies by utilizing a working memory task that is perceived as less
stressful by participants, such as backwards digit span.
In order to examine relationships between feelings of threat and performance on working
memory task, data were pooled across experimental manipulation and working memory
performance was regressed on changes in threat feelings over the course of the experiment.
Individuals who felt threatened by the experiment (relative to baseline) tended to have an
increase in working memory performance, but there was no relationship between threat and
behavioral inhibition.
Similarly, challenge appraisals were pooled across experimental manipulation and
working memory scores were regressed on changes in challenge appraisals during the
experiment. Working memory was significantly predicted by changes in challenge appraisals,
such that individuals who showed an increase in challenge showed a decrease in working
memory capacity (relative to baseline). There was no relationship between challenge and
behavioral inhibition.
This relationship between challenge appraisals and decreases in working memory is
particularly interesting because of its irony. Supposedly, challenge is an appraisal of having the
resources to deal with a task, and yet here is evidence that a challenge appraisal depletes a
resource that is needed to perform well on tasks. The potential psychological and physiological
mechanisms for this relationship should be explored in future studies.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although the present study was able to add to the literature by demonstrating how
physiological reactions to failure feedback can be used to predict aggressive behavior, several of
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the null results could potentially be due to a failure to detect effects that may be present but were
not detected by the measurement of constructs. For example, there was a lack of variability in
the aggression variable, with the majority of participants not penalizing the experimenter,
thereby making it more difficult to examine relationships between psychological, physiological
and behavioral variables. Future studies should implement variables with more variability – such
as the Taylor Aggression Paradigm (Taylor, 1967) – to better understand relationships between
personality and behavior. A second benefit of using more direct measures of aggression, such as
the TAP is that it could possibly be a better measure of hostile aggression which may be more
directly related to behavioral inhibition and cognitive constructs such as working memory and
emotional experiences such as anger (Ramirez & Andreu, 2006). Another way to increase
variance in aggression would be to use a stronger manipulation of insult. Rather than a single
insult, as was provided in the present study, the experimenter could substantially increase their
insulting behavior – for example, berating the participant after every task, and asking questions
such as “Did you even try?” This stronger manipulation may increase variance in the aggression
variable and could help to elucidate relationships between the independent variables and
aggression.
Another limitation of the present study is a confound between feelings of threat and the
working memory task. Several participants reported feeling threatened by the task itself,
especially the instruction to make sure to keep the math score over 85%. In order to obtain a
more pure examination of the relationships between appraisals, working memory and aggression,
future studies should employ measures of working memory that are less threatening to
participants.
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A final weakness of the present study is that the physiological markers of threat and
challenge did not predict self-reported feelings of threat and challenge. There are several
potential reasons for this discrepancy. First, the manipulations may not have sufficiently
activated threat and challenge appraisals of the situations, although the relationship between
physiology and challenge self-report did show a nonsignificant trend in the hypothesized
direction. Second, the self-report measure that was utilized to measure threat/challenge
appraisals may have been inadequate. The measure that was utilized asked the participant to rate
how they were feeling at that moment. An appraisal is technically how a person feels toward an
object or situation. Therefore, a more appropriate question may have been “how are you feeling
right at this moment toward the tasks in this experiment?” Or, retrospectively, “how were you
feeling about your performance on the tasks as you completed them?” This may have increased
the correlations between self-report and physiological variables. Finally, threat and challenge
are, by definition, anticipatory appraisals and occur before a stressful situation (Tomaka,
Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993). The self-report questionnaire was administered at the
conclusion of the study and therefore was measuring emotional reactions that were the result of
the appraisals that had occurred earlier. In order to measure the appraisals directly, the selfreport questionnaires should have been administered prior to the behavioral task (e.g., before the
automated working memory task) instead of at the conclusion of the study when there was no
anticipation occurring.
Although the current research has found a relationship between challenge appraisals and
aggression, the predictors of which individuals exhibit a challenge response when presented with
failure feedback remain elusive. A previous study had found that insecure explicit self-esteem
was able to predict threat/challenge responses to negative feedback (Seery et al., 2004), but the
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previous study found no relationship between implicit and explicit self-esteem in predicting
threat/challenge responses. Few studies have examined individual differences in predicting
threat/challenge appraisals, but one study (Tomaka et al., 1999) found that assertiveness was able
to predict threat/challenge responses to situations such that high levels of assertiveness were
associated with challenge appraisals, whereas low levels of assertiveness were associated with
threat. In a later study, it was found that neuroticism is able to predict threat appraisals and task
performance in response to a stressor (Schneider, 2004). Future studies should integrate these
promising personality variables, such as neuroticism and assertiveness, to better understand
individual differences in threat/challenge appraisals and how they can be used to predict
behavior.
One potential explanation for the lack of findings in the behavioral inhibition data may be
that the methods that were utilized in the present study were not sufficiently sensitive to measure
behavioral inhibition. The present method of measuring behavioral inhibition was adapted from
studies that modified the Go/No-go task for use in functional imaging and event-related potential
studies, which typically correlate Go/No-go performance with brain activity rather than behavior.
Cognitive Psychology studies typically use more sensitive measures of behavioral inhibition,
such as a stop-signal reaction time task (Logan & Cowan, 1984). In a stop-signal task, the
participant is required to respond to a stimulus in almost every presentation, except when a stopsignal is presented (such as the sounding of a tone). The tone is presented shortly after the
presentation of the go-signal, and by varying the delay of the tone, the probability of successful
inhibition is varied (Aron & Poldrack, 2006). By utilizing a more specific manipulation of
threat/challenge appraisals, and a more sensitive measure of behavioral inhibition, any potential
relationships that may not have been detected in the present study may become clear.
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In summary, if I were to repeat this investigation, I would choose measures that have
increased variability (such as the Taylor Aggression Paradigm), sensitivity (such as a Stop Signal
Reaction Time task) and are not as threatening to the participants (i.e., working memory tasks
involving solving math problems in the presence of an experimenter). I would also add a more
direct measure of appraisals (via self-report) that would be administered immediately after the
manipulation, but before the behavioral task for which the manipulation was intended. I feel
these changes to the procedure would significantly strengthen the investigation of the
relationships between the present constructs.
One goal of the present study was to better understand the cognitive mechanisms that
mediate the relationship between threat/challenge and aggressive behavior. Based on previous
research, it was hypothesized that working memory and behavioral inhibition would be the
primary mediators between appraisals and behavior. Unfortunately, the data did not support
such a model. However, other studies have found support for a relationship between threat
appraisals and working memory (Schmader et al., 2003), and inhibition and aggression (Strüber,
Lück, & Roth, 2008). One difference between the present study and other studies of threat and
working memory is that the present study utilized a baseline measure of working memory and
observed how the appraisals of threat or challenge were associated with a change in working
memory. The hypothesized link between threat and working memory in the present study relied
on the influence of cortisol in directly inhibiting working memory abilities. As was discussed
above, there was no relationship between cortisol and working memory changes, and the
relationship between cortisol and working memory abilities has been inconsistent in other
studies. This may hint at a separate mediating mechanism by which stress impairs working
memory (e.g. redirecting selective attention toward opposing goals, away from working memory
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capacity). Future studies should investigate these pathways by experimentally manipulating
cortisol and examining the influence on attention, working memory and other executive
functions.
Conclusion
The present study has examined how failure feedback leads to aggressive behavior in
certain individuals. Those participants who exhibited a physiological challenge response to
failure feedback were the most aggressive, and in a separate study, challenge appraisals were
associated with a decrease in working memory. However, there was no relationship present
between physiology, working memory, or working memory and aggression. The present study
contributes to the literature on aggression by integrating a psychophysiological approach,
utilizing a biopsychosocial model of information processing. By utilizing such an approach, it
has helped understand the antecedents of aggressive behavior.
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APPENDIX A – EXPERIMENTER EVALUATION FORM
Experimenter Evaluation Form
The Clinical Neuropsychology Lab takes great effort to ensure that each participant is treated in
a friendly and professional manner. To that end, we ask each participant to rate their experience
with the experimenter. These evaluations will be viewed by the laboratory director (Dr. Tricia
King). Dr. King then uses this feedback to make decisions on whether or not to hire the
experimenter next semester.
To ensure anonymity, please place this evaluation in an envelope and place it in the
survey drop box. Please do not write your name on this form.
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The experimenter seemed to be capable and competent.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5
Neutral

6

7

8

9
Strongly
Agree

6

7

8

9
Strongly
Agree

The experimenter was friendly and likable.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5
Neutral

The experimenter is doing a good job and represents the lab well.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5
Neutral

6

7

8

9
Strongly
Agree

Based on my experience today, I would recommend this researcher be hired to conduct this study
next semester.
1
2
Strongly
Disagree

3

4

5
Neutral

6

7

8

9
Strongly
Agree
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APPENDIX B – THREAT/CHALLENGE FACTORS
In order to measure threat and challenge, selected words from the PANAS questionnaire
were selected. Participants rated how much they were feeling each emotion “right at this
moment” (1 = slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely). It is worth noting that all items for the
challenge list were selected from the positive section of the PANAS, whereas all of the threat
items were selected from the negative section. The items that were selected were chosen because
it was felt they reflected words that are associated with threatening (or challenging) motivational
states. Threat appraisals have been shown to be associated more strongly with negative
emotional reactions (Fischer, Shaver, & Carnochan, 1990; Tomaka et al., 1993), whereas
challenge appraisals are more associated with positive incentives and result in positive mood
states (Tomaka et al., 1993).
PANAS questionnaires were pooled across the three experiments, producing a total of
482 participants. The dataset was split randomly in half with the purpose of conducting
exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. Data were analyzed using maximum likelihood
(ML) analysis. All sixteen variables were subjected to factor analysis with Promax (oblique)
rotation. This rotation was chosen a priori because it was likely that the factors would be
correlated due to the relatedness of the variables on the scale. Initially, three components were
identified with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, but after examining the Scree plot only two factors
were retained. Therefore, the factor analysis was re-run with the intent of extracting two factors.
Rotated factor loadings are shown below. Variables with loadings greater than .4 were assigned
to the corresponding factor. The first factor was associated with nine items and accounted for
29% of the variance in the model. The second factor was associated with six items and
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accounted for 22% of the variance. In total, the two factors accounted for 52% of the variance
and were correlated at r = .08.
In order to test this model, the other half of the data was utilized in a confirmatory factor
analysis. Again, ML Analysis with Promax rotation was utilized and two factors were extracted.
Again, nine items loaded on factor 1 which accounted for 31% of the variance, and six items
loaded on factor 2, accounting for 25% of the variance. The two factors were correlated at r = .07. Critically, the same items loaded on the same factors in both analyses.

Factor 1 (Threat): guilty, scared, afraid, ashamed, upset, nervous, distressed,
irritable, hostile
Factor 2 (Challenge): excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, active, inspired
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APPENDIX C – IMPLICIT SELF-ESTEEM MODEL
After examining the data, it appeared that a more parsimonious model involving only
implicit self-esteem (without explicit self-esteem) might result in a better fit of the data. In order
to examine this possibility, analyses for Experiment 1 (self-esteem predicting working memory
and physiology) and Experiment 2 (self-esteem predicting inhibition and aggression) were
conducted with implicit self-esteem as the only self-esteem variable.
Implicit-Self Esteem and Physiology. To examine the relationship between implicit selfesteem, feedback and physiology, separate hierarchical regressions were performed with selfesteem and feedback as predictors of cortisol and MAP reactivity. In each regression, baseline
physiology levels were entered in a preliminary step as a covariate. When post-task cortisol
levels were regressed on feedback type, implicit self-esteem, and the interaction between the two
variables, the first-order variables accounted for a nonsignificant portion of the variance, Fchange
(2, 98) = 2.43, p = .09, R2change = .03. The interaction term did not account for a significant
portion of variance above the first order terms, Fchange (1, 97) = .11, p = .74, R2change = .00.
For mean arterial pressure, first-order terms did not account for a significant portion of
variance, Fchange (2, 109) = 2.19, p = .12, R2change = .01, nor did the interaction term, Fchange (1,
108) = .03, p = .85, R2change = .00.
Implicit self-esteem and behavioral inhibition. The relationship between feedback,
implicit self-esteem and behavioral inhibition was investigated in the deconstructed interaction in
Experiment 2. Following negative feedback, implicit self-esteem was inversely correlated with
behavioral inhibition (i.e., higher implicit self-esteem was associated with fewer mistakes in
behavioral inhibition), b = -.72, t (84) = -2.22, p < .05, pr2 = .04.
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Implicit self-esteem and aggression. In order to examine the relationship between
implicit self-esteem and aggression, a logistic regression analysis was conducted with implicit
self-esteem, feedback, and the interaction between self-esteem and feedback as the sole
predictors of aggressive behavior. The full model containing all predictors exhibited a trend
toward significance, χ2 (8, N = 299) = 14.81, p = .06, indicating that the model was unable to
distinguish between participants who penalized the experimenter from those who did not. The
model as a whole explained between 4.3% (Cox and Snell R2) and 6.2% (Nagelkerke R2) of the
variance in experimenter ratings and correctly classified 69.7% of the cases. Feedback type (B =
.789, Wald = 8.70, Odds Ratio = 2.20, p < .05) and implicit self-esteem (B = -4.48, Wald = 4.04,
Odds Ratio = .01, p < .05) were significant predictors of aggression. However, the interaction
term was nonsignificant (B = .09, Wald = .00, p = .96).
Therefore, it appears that a model including only implicit self-esteem (without explicit
self-esteem) does not adequately represent the data. Although this is the case in this dataset, I do
not feel it suggests that implicit self-esteem is not a relevant construct to include in investigations
of the relationship between self-esteem and aggression. As discussed above (General
Discussion), the present study had several shortcomings, including a measure of aggression that
lacked variability and may not have been directly related to impulsive aggression. Modern
attitude research has continually found evidence for the existence, and importance, of dualattitudes and therefore steps should be taken to measure both attitudes whenever possible in
order to gain a more complete understanding of variance in constructs.

